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 II 
Small firms make up a large proportion of businesses in Saskatchewan and likely have more 
potential for innovation given their diversity and flexibility. As agribusiness refers to all firms 
involved in food production, including input suppliers, producers, processors, distributors and 
retailers, small agribusinesses play a significant role in the economy and assist in diversifying 
agriculture. Of these, small producers and processors, however, are at a disadvantage in the 
current, highly consolidated and concentrated retail market environment. Largely restricted to a 
cottage industry-sized market they suffer from not generating sufficient profits from their 
commercialization of new products. Due to capital constraints, limited access to financing, and 
poor understanding of manufacturing, business management, and marketing, they also face many 
challenges and barriers to entering commercial retail markets where supermarket chains 
predominate.  
Given this perspective, commercialization in small Saskatchewan agribusinesses is analyzed 
using a case study approach. Relying on supply chain theory and transaction cost economics, a 
theoretical framework to model successful commercialization by small firms is developed and 
tested in case studies undertaken among Saskatchewan food processors. In particular, economic 
models of commercialization and a checklist for commercialization are developed. The models 
assume that small agribusinesses can access commercial markets through achieving economies 
of scale and, hence, succeed in commercializing their new products. The checklist for 
commercialization includes three main challenges of commercialization, namely increasing 
production scale, accessing commercial markets, and defining optimal production scale and 
corresponding barriers. A case study analysis has given some validity to the applicability of the 
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CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION 
1.1   Overview of innovation and commercialization in Saskatchewan 
Saskatchewan (SK) is a major grain producer in Canada, inhabited by just over one million 
people (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2008a). According to Enterprise Saskatchewan 
(ES, 2009), in 2008 Saskatchewan’s real GDP was $41.6 billion (in 2002 chained dollars1
Most importantly, over the period 2004 to 2008, when its international exports grew, on average, 
by 18.3 percent per year, Saskatchewan led the Canadian provinces in growth in international 
exports (ES, 2009). Specifically, Saskatchewan’s international exports rose from $19.7 billion in 
2007 to $29.6 billion in 2008 (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). This sharp increase 
resulted from a dramatic rise in prices for agricultural commodities as well as potash, uranium, 
) and 
grew by 4.4%. This was the highest growth rate among the Canadian provinces. The province’s 
real GDP grew, on average, by 2.0 percent annually between 2004 and 2008, when the national 
average growth was 1.8 percent (ES, 2009). Agriculture and food processing play a considerable 
role in Saskatchewan, comprising about 13% of provincial GDP in 2008 (AAFC, 2009). More 
specifically, Saskatchewan is a leading producer of cereal and pulse crops nationally and 
supplies approximately five percent of the world's exported wheat (Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2008a). In 2006, six million hectares of all classes of wheat with a value of $1.5 
billion was produced in Saskatchewan (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2008a). In 2007, 
Saskatchewan produced nearly four million tonnes of canola, which was 45 percent of Canada's 
total canola production (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2008a). Moreover, the province 
is the second largest cattle and beef producer in Canada, producing more than $1 billion annually 
(Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2008a).  
                                                 
1 This is a measure computed with 2002 as a reference year. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the 
US Department of Commerce (2009), the chained-dollar value is calculated by multiplying the reference year 
current-dollar value by the chain type Fisher quantity index and dividing by 100 for GDP and most other series.  
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oil and other resource-based products (ES, 2009). In 2009, Saskatchewan’s agri-food exports 
were $8.1 billion, representing 37% of total Saskatchewan exports (Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2010).  Particularly, exports of crops, livestock and processed products accounted 
for 86%, 2% and 11% of total agri-food exports, respectively (Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2010). Wheat and durum were the major export crops and comprised 41% of crop 
exports and 36% of total agri-food exports in 2009, followed by canola seed, lentils and peas. 
Cattle and calf exports accounted for 80% of total livestock exports in 2009, while live hog 
exports represented 11% of total livestock exports (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 
2010). Saskatchewan supplies considerable quantities of agri-food products to other provinces in 
addition to international exports. 
In 2008, the value of Saskatchewan’s manufacturing shipments increased by 17.5 percent to a 
record 12.3 billion dollars (ES, 2009) which, however, was about 12 and 22 times lower than 
those of Quebec and Ontario, respectively. This suggests that Saskatchewan does not excel at 
value added production since manufacturing shipments show how successfully the province is 
diversifying out of reliance on primary resources; adding value and developing and 
commercializing new products (ES, 2009). For example, about 300 food processing companies 
in Saskatchewan produce 2.4 billion dollars of output annually – primarily cereal, meat, dairy 
products, bakery goods, and food ingredients (ES, 2010). Their output represented nearly 6 
percent2
Saskatchewan, however, has a history of agricultural innovation that underpins its success in 
agricultural production. Saskatchewan was, for instance, involved in the research that led to the 
development of canola, which now has become the second largest crop, after wheat, grown in the 
province. The University of Saskatchewan (U of S) plays an important role in agricultural 
research in the province and Canada. Major initiatives include the important research facilities 
 of real GDP on average during the period of 2004- 2008. Processed products comprised 
only 11% of total agri-food exports in 2009 (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2010), 
further evidence that value-adding activity lags somewhat in Saskatchewan.  
                                                 
2 6 per cent was calculated based on Saskatchewan’s real GDP (in 2002 chained dollars) taken from Enterprise 
Saskatchewan. (2009). Measuring Saskatchewan’s progress: Performance indicators for Saskatchewan’s economy. 
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such as the Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization, the Canadian Light Source synchrotron 
and the Innovation Place. The latter is one of the largest research parks in North America and is 
located on the university campus. Since its establishment, the research undertaken at the 
university has resulted in many innovations. For example, over 100 new crop varieties and the 
first genetically engineered vaccine for animals have been developed at the University of 
Saskatchewan (U of S, 2009). The university has also been successful in commercializing many 
of these innovations so that farmers and consumers, both in Saskatchewan and beyond, have 
benefitted (Brown, 2008). In addition to public research fostering innovation, individuals and 
private companies have actively engaged in developing new products, processes, and 
technologies and some have successfully commercialized their new ideas. In particular, many of 
the entrepreneurial successes have been in the farm equipment and technology area; e.g.  Morris3 
and zero-till technology4, but there have also been successes in food and consumer products such 
as Riverbend5
                                                 
3 Morris Industries Ltd. is a worldwide manufacturer and distributor of agricultural equipment, headquartered in 
Saskatchewan.  
4 Zero-till or no-till is a conservational tillage system in which the seeds are sowed directly into the untilled soil that 
has retained the crop residues from the previous crop (Derpsch et al., 2011).  
5 Riverbend Plantation Inc., a family owned Saskatoon berry orchard and food processing company located in 
Saskatchewan, produces fruit based products.   
 (Brown, 2008).   
Nonetheless, Saskatchewan ranked ninth among the ten provinces of Canada in terms of research 
and development (R&D) spending as a percentage of GDP at 1.0 percent in 2006, which was 
well below the national average of 1.9 percent (ES, 2009). This percentage, including R&D 
spending of the government, private businesses, universities, and non-government organizations 
within the province, shows that the province did not spend as much as other provinces on R&D. 
As a result, this may limit innovation and slow economic growth. In particular, in 2006 private 
businesses contributed 36.2 percent of total R&D spending in the province, up from 26.9 percent 
in 2002 (ES, 2009); although, the share was far below those of Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta 
whose businesses accounted for over 50 percent of total R&D.  
 4 
Saskatchewan ranked fourth in the country in the number of patents per capita in 2007, 
producing 4.2 patents per 100,000 people, which was below the Canadian average of 5.5 and 
significantly behind the leader Alberta with 10.3 (ES, 2009). Since patents offer inventors 
monopoly rights to commercialize their inventions for a specified period, the number of patents 
per capita can indicate the intensity of R&D, innovation, and commercialization activities. 
Finally, in terms of venture capital6 investment per capita, Saskatchewan was in fourth place 
among the provinces in 2007 with $59.17 per capita, which is low compared to the national 
average of $63.15 per capita (ES, 2009).  The amount of venture capital investment indicates 
investors’ willingness to invest in the province and the quality of projects under development, 
although this indicator needs to be interpreted with caution due to how difficult it is to estimate. 
Human capital in the workforce indicates innovative capacity of economies because a highly 
qualified workforce drives innovation and productivity growth in the economy. The employment 
of post-secondary graduates as a percentage of total employment increased slightly from 49.1 
percent in 2004 to 49.8 percent in 2008, placing Saskatchewan ninth among the ten provinces. 
Also, the percentage of scientists and engineers employed in Saskatchewan’s economy grew 
from 4.0 percent in 2004 to 5.1 percent in 2008 with a slight improvement from 10th to being 9th
In a Statistics Canada’s survey on “Financing of Small and Medium Enterprises 2007”, small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are defined as commercial firms with fewer than 500 
employees and less than $50 million in annual revenues (SME Financing Data Initiative
 
among the provinces, while the national average increased from 6.6 percent to 7.1 percent in the 
same period (ES, 2009). All of these indicators suggest that innovation remains a challenge for 
Saskatchewan.  
7
                                                 
6 Venture capital is private equity investment typically provided to start-up firms by investors with the interest of 
generating a return (ES, 2009).  
7 SME Financing Data Initiative is a partnership between Industry Canada, Statistics Canada and the Department of 
Finance (SME Financing Data Initiative, 2009).  
, 2009). 
However, according to the definition of Industry Canada (2009), goods-producing firms that 
have fewer than 100 employees and service-providing firms employing fewer than 50 employees 
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are considered “small”. As of December 2008, there were just over one million small businesses 
that accounted for nearly 98 percent of all businesses in Canada (Industry Canada, 2009). 
According to Industry Canada (2009), these small firms dominated in all industries, representing 
over 90% of total businesses in each industry except for public administration (83.1%). 
Likewise, at the same time small businesses represented 98.4% of total businesses in 
Saskatchewan, while medium-sized and large businesses represented only 1.4% and 0.2%, 
respectively (Industry Canada, 2009). During the period of 1998-2008, small firms accounted for 
36% of all jobs created, on average, in the private sector, although the relative contribution to job 
creation by small, medium-sized and large firms varied greatly over the years (Industry Canada, 
2009). These statistics indicate that small firms play a considerable role in the economy of 
Saskatchewan and Canada through the products and services they provide as well as the jobs 
they create.  
In this regard, along with programs funded by the federal government, Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada (AAFC) and other organizations, the Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture has 
implemented some programs, namely the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF), the 
Saskatchewan Agri-Value Initiative Funding, etc. to provide financial assistance to producers 
and processors in order to support the development and diversification of Saskatchewan’s 
agriculture and food sector. Under the research and development component of the ADF, for 
example, the Ministry provided funding of $7.91 million for 204 projects in the areas of 
livestock, crops, value-added production, soil, environment, horticulture and alternative crops 
during the fiscal year of 2007-08 (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2008b).  
In addition, in conjunction with universities, research institutes, and industrial associations, the 
Ministry of Agriculture provides technical support to firms in the agriculture and food industry, 
establishing new product development and processing facilities like the Saskatchewan Food 
Industry Development Centre, the Saskatchewan Toll Processing Centre, and the Protein Oil and 
Starch (POS) Pilot Plant. The Saskatchewan Food Industry Development Centre Inc. (Food 
Centre), a fee-for-service organization, supports the development of value-added processing in 
Saskatchewan by providing specialized services, training and a federally inspected pilot plant 
that aids in the commercialization of food products (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 
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2008b). The Saskatchewan Toll Processing Centre provides a federally-inspected meat 
processing facility, which can be used by small/ new meat processing companies for a fee until 
they build their own facilities (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 2008b). Along with 
conducting contract research and development for bio-processing, the POS Pilot Plant also 
manufactures products for producers serving small, specialty markets, namely food, functional 
foods, dietary supplements, food ingredients, cosmetics, animal feeds, and agricultural 
biotechnology (POS Pilot Plant Corp., 2010).  
1.2   Problem statement 
In the past few years, Saskatchewan’s innovation and commercialization performance has been 
generally below the national average. In particular, the near full employment rate of highly 
qualified human resources and the investments in R&D and commercialization activities have 
been insufficient to drive innovation at levels that will allow diversification out of primary 
products. In particular, Saskatchewan produces a relatively small amount of value added 
products except for machinery and equipment; instead, it actively engages in commodity markets 
nationally and globally. In addition, the small number of patents issued annually on a per capita 
basis and a relatively low availability of venture capital investment in early-stage businesses 
indicate that the current economic environment does not foster the desired level of innovation 
and commercialization. Private businesses’ involvement in R&D activities, as evidenced by the 
contribution to the province’s expenditures on R&D, has been noticeably lagging as well.  
The commercialization process is a lengthy undertaking, from consistently developing ideas to 
marketing new products. Since marketing the products is essential and can be very costly, 
commercialization requires entrepreneurs to be persistent. In the past couple of decades, many 
entrepreneurs have proposed ideas for new food and other agriculturally related products; 
however, many of these ideas have not made it beyond the R&D stage. A few of the 
entrepreneurs have reached the stage of producing samples or prototypes of their innovative 
products and some have attempted to move to the stage of commercial production (Brown, 
2008).  
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Generally, the failure rate in commercializing new products and services is high due, mainly, to 
capital constraints, lack of knowledge of manufacturing, business management, and marketing, 
and high unit costs during the early stage of commercialization. Entrepreneurs need access to 
considerable capital to take their innovative products from the idea stage to putting finished 
products in consumers’ hands. Raising sufficient capital is a major challenge for Saskatchewan 
entrepreneurs.  Since small and new agribusinesses usually do not have sufficient tangible 
property that can be used as collateral to obtain adequate amounts of credit, they need to raise 
equity capital to satisfy their capital needs, bringing in investors. Often this means relinquishing 
some or even total control of their company (Brown, 2008). However, it is also hard to find 
owners of capital who are willing to invest in risky ventures such as new product development 
and who are willing to wait several years to earn positive returns from their investments.  
Many entrepreneurs do not have the requisite knowledge and experience pertaining to 
commercial production or processing - where often their activities must comply with federal 
and/or provincial regulations as well as retailer requirements. Further, as they lack the 
knowledge and skills related to product design, business management, and marketing, they need 
to hire specialists, who write successful business plans, do marketing research in targeted 
markets, and design products. They need to hire skilled workers, who have knowledge about new 
technologies, new production process, etc., for their production processes and further may need 
to train workers in cases when it is hard to find the skilled workers.  
Marketing products through retailers or supermarket chains is a particular challenge for small 
scale or start-up agribusinesses and raises their costs because many retailers require their 
suppliers to supply large quantities at a low price as well as meet their specific food safety and 
quality standards in addition to public regulations. Indeed, in recent years, the market place has 
changed significantly due, in part, to globalization and expanding international trade. 
Globalization and trade have resulted in highly competitive markets where low cost producers, 
processors, and retailers have gained most of the market share, competing strongly with firms in 
high cost regions (Brown and Sander, 2007). This has led to a high degree of consolidation and 
concentration in many facets of the agriculture, food and fibre industry globally (Brown, 2008). 
The result is fewer and much larger firms. The food retail sector, in particular, has been 
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experiencing the highest degree of consolidation and concentration in order to better incorporate 
social and environmental responsibilities into their actions in the face of concerned consumers 
(Konefal, Mascarenhas, and Hatanaka, 2005; Brown and Sander, 2007). 
 Larger firms can secure low unit costs for their products or services by spreading fixed costs 
over large quantities of production or services. In some cases this leads to large market shares 
and sometimes allows such firms to exercise considerable market power.  As a result, these 
larger firms are sometimes able to exploit their market power when competing and partnering 
with new and smaller market entrants. Furthermore, larger firms carry out their businesses in 
many markets – sometimes in different countries - diversifying their sources of revenue and 
garnering economies of scale.  
On the other hand, new market entrants usually target local or regional markets, such as 
Saskatchewan and western Canada, which are sometimes not a sufficiently large market to 
achieve economies of scale. Indeed, entering national or international markets require a large 
capital investment, but new market entrants are often constrained by available commercial scale 
facilities and financial capital as well as the specialized human resources that are required to 
carry out large scale manufacturing activities. The government of Saskatchewan has been 
supporting R&D and commercialization activities and value-added production through providing 
new product development and processing facilities. However, these facilities are usually used in 
the early stage of the commercialization process and not designed to manufacture or process 
products on a sufficiently large commercial scale to reduce producers or processors’ unit costs 
(Brown, 2008).  
Commercialization of new products that fosters the development of high value-added industries 
may be the key to Saskatchewan’s economic growth and future prosperity. With this perspective, 
this thesis will address issues related to innovation and commercialization of agri-food products 
for small Saskatchewan agribusinesses, investigating factors related to the success of 
commercialization and barriers to commercialization.  
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1.3   Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze commercialization of innovation in small 
Saskatchewan agribusinesses. In particular, the thesis aims to 1) document the factors affecting 
commercialization successes or failures, particularly the barriers to commercialization faced by 
small scale or start-up Saskatchewan agribusinesses, 2) develop a theoretical framework to 
illustrate how small firms achieve successful commercialization, which can apply to small 
commercializing firms anywhere in the world, and 3) develop strategies that endeavour to 
overcome challenges associated with commercialization and that result in successful 
commercialization. In order to achieve these goals, a case study approach is employed to 
investigate the factors derived from the literature review and to test the validity of economic 
models of commercialization designed for small innovative firms.  
1.4   Organization of thesis 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 outlines a review 
of the literature related to innovation and commercialization of product innovation and theories 
applicable to commercialization of new products. More specifically, supply chain theory and 
transaction cost economics are discussed in this chapter as a basis for explaining factors affecting 
commercialization, particularly integration into supply chain relationships. They are also used to 
develop effective strategies of commercialization designed for small innovative agribusinesses. 
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework that illustrates successful commercialization by 
small agribusinesses and their challenges and barriers to commercialization. Economic models of 
commercialization that show the relationship between commercialization and economies of scale 
in two representative situations encountered by small commercializing firms and a 
commercialization checklist are developed and discussed in this chapter. Chapter 4 presents an 
analysis of commercialization in small Saskatchewan agribusinesses using a case study approach 
and summarizes the results of the case studies. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with a summary of 
research findings. Suggestions for future research and limitations of the study are also included 
in this final chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2:   LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the literature related to innovation and commercialization and 
theories applicable to commercialization. Innovation and commercialization of product 
innovations are discussed in detail, covering the innovation process and commercialization 
models.  This thesis draws from supply chain theory and transaction cost economics. Supply 
chain theory helps to explain the challenges of entering supply chains, determining requirements 
and opportunities for partnership in the chains and, thus, to develop effective strategies of 
commercialization designed for small innovative agribusinesses. Transaction cost economics, on 
the other hand, is used to explain how transaction costs influence current economic conditions 
and markets, vertical coordination between the parties within the product life cycle and further a 
firm’s decision making regarding the choice of partners.  
2.2   Innovation and commercialization 
According to Seperich, Woolverton, and Beierlein (1994), agribusiness involves all activities 
performed both on and off farms, which means it includes not only farmers or producers, but also 
the individuals and firms that provide the inputs, process the output, manufacture the food 
products, and transport and sell the products to consumers. Therefore, activities carried out by 
agribusinesses make the food and fibre system work. More specifically, agribusiness consists of 
agricultural input production, manufacturing or processing, and the distribution/retail sectors.  
As competition increases with globalization, firms need to continuously innovate to gain 
competitive advantage, differentiating products or services from those of competitors and 
successfully capturing consumers’ needs. Indeed, innovation is a critical success factor for firms, 
particularly in highly competitive markets. Innovation involves changes and improvements to 
technologies, products, processes, and services (Rainey, 2005) that bring direct benefits to 
customers and firms as well as externalities or spill-over benefits to society and rivals. The third 
edition of the Oslo Manual, which proposes guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation 
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data in industries, more broadly suggests that “an innovation is the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new 
organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations” 
(OECD/Eurostat, 2005, p. 46).  
More specifically, the Oslo Manual distinguishes four types of innovations: product innovations, 
process innovations, marketing innovations and organizational innovations. A product 
innovation is defined in the manual as “the introduction of a good or service that is new or 
significantly improved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses” (OECD/Eurostat, 
2005, p. 48). A process innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
production or delivery method including significant changes in techniques, equipment and/or 
software (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). A marketing innovation is the implementation of a new 
marketing method that significantly improves product design or packaging, product placement, 
product promotion or pricing (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). The manual defines an organisational 
innovation as “the implementation of a new organisational method in the firm’s business 
practices, workplace organisation or external relations” (OECD/Eurostat, 2005, p. 51).  
Innovations generally have an objective to improve a firm’s performance, but each type of 
innovation has specific objectives. Both product and process innovations can be a source of 
market advantage for the innovating firm. Product innovations aim to increase demand and 
mark-ups, while process innovations intend to decrease unit costs of production or delivery, to 
increase quality, or to produce or deliver new or significantly improved products 
(OECD/Eurostat, 2005). Marketing innovations aim to better identify customer needs, opening 
up new markets, or newly positioning a firm’s product on the market, with the objective of 
increasing the firm’s sales (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). Organisational innovations intend to increase 
a firm’s performance by reducing administrative costs or transaction costs, improving workplace 
satisfaction and thereby labour productivity, gaining access to non-tradable assets such as non-
codified external knowledge or reducing costs of supplies (OECD/Eurostat, 2005). 
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Low and medium-technology industries are generally characterised by incremental innovation 
and adoption often focused on production efficiency, product differentiation and marketing 
(OECD/Eurostat, 2005). As most small-scale firms belong to low and medium-technology 
industries because of physical, financial and human capital constraints, product innovation is 
most applicable to innovation by small agribusinesses. Results of the study by Herath, Cranfield, 
and Henson (2008) revealed that firms with multiple product lines were not actively engaged in 
product development. This, on the other hand, implies that the most innovative firms engaged in 
product development tend to be start-up enterprises focusing on one or a very limited number of 
product lines. They also suggest that a narrower product focus is important for successful 
product development; however, diversification and development of product portfolios are more 
critical in the case of commercialization. 
A Statistics Canada Innovation survey of 800 food-processing companies in Canada revealed 
that over 70% of them invested in innovation during the period between 2001 and 2003 
(Statistics Canada, 2005). More specifically, 37% of the companies in the survey introduced 
product innovations to the market, whereas nearly a quarter of the establishments introduced 
process innovations into their lines. Over this period, establishments in fruit and vegetable 
preserving and specialty food manufacturing were most likely to have introduced product 
innovations, with 55% of companies having done so, followed by 47% of sugar and 
confectionery product manufacturing establishments and 16% of the seafood product preparation 
and packaging establishments. Only 36% of establishments engaged in product innovations 
developed completely new products, while approximately 55% made significant changes or 
improvements to existing products. This study indicates that product innovation comprises the 
major portion of innovations developed by food manufacturers.  
Herath et al. (2008) state that “in the agri-food industry, product innovations can range from 
minor food-product reformulations to crops and products that are physically or genetically novel 
or different” (p. 207). Small agribusinesses generally focus on the innovative ideas that provide 
solutions to the problems or needs of a particular segment of consumers as well as reducing 
production costs to ensure efficient production. Rainey (2005) notes that product innovation 
internally depends on the firm’s knowledge, experience, capabilities, resources, and current 
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technologies, but it externally focuses on consumer’s needs and preferences. This suggests that 
innovators should undertake thorough studies to identify consumer needs or market 
requirements. Therefore, the degree to which an innovator tried to satisfy the needs of users may 
be a key factor for the successes or failures of a product innovation.  
Traill and Meulenberg (2002) believe that in the food industry, three orientations are likely to 
dominate in different firms: product orientation, where product quality dominates in a company’s 
culture; process orientation in which a company pays more attention to flexibility, efficiency, 
speed etc.; and market orientation, in which a company focuses on producing what the market 
wants. Comparing twelve case studies undertaken in six European countries to a survey of 
European food manufacturers, they reported that to some extent market orientation dominated in 
these food-manufacturing companies. This suggests that addressing market needs is essential for 
product innovation by food manufacturers. 
Uhrbach (2009) states that the innovation process involves three major groups of activities: 
general innovation activities; commercialization activities; and post-commercialization activities. 
General innovation activities may include: engaging in R&D; purchasing R&D from outside the 
plant and firm, acquisition of equipment, machinery and software; purchase or licensing of 
patents and non-patented inventions, know-how, and other types of knowledge from other firms 
or organizations; and training. Activities associated with commercialization of innovative 
products may include: market research; launching advertising; a market plan; product positioning 
or profiling; profitability analysis; a project feasibility study; and testing consumer acceptance of 
the products. Post-commercialization activities, which are important to ensure the success of a 
newly launched innovation, may include: post-introduction advertising campaigns; entering into 
distribution agreements; international marketing partnerships; and after sales consumer feedback. 
Research and development is the main source of innovation and thus facilitates new product 
development. According to the Frascati Manual8
                                                 
8 Frascati Manual proposes an internationally recognized methodology for collecting and using R&D statistics. 
, research and development involves 
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undertaking basic and applied research to acquire new knowledge and direct research towards 
specific inventions such as developing new products and processes (OECD, 2002). In other 
words, research is investigation undertaken on a systematic basis to gain knowledge while 
development is the application of research findings for the creation of new products and 
processes. Accordingly, innovation builds on knowledge and thus has aspects of a public good 
that is non-rival and non-excludable. When innovation is not protected by intellectual property 
rights it is difficult to exclude others from using or imitating such new ideas or innovations, 
although the use of the knowledge of innovations by one individual does not reduce the amount 
available for others to use. In this case, innovating firms cannot capture all the benefits generated 
by their innovations. Therefore, innovations often need to be protected by intellectual property 
rights such as patents, licences, copyrights, plant or animal breeder’s privilege, etc. to provide 
incentives for private firms to carry out R&D and innovation activities.   
In turn, a firm’s expenditures on R&D may indicate its innovative behaviour and innovation 
potential.  Statistics on Scientific Research and Experimental Development Tax Credits show 
that small businesses spend far less on innovation than large firms in absolute amounts, but their 
spending as a percentage of revenue far exceeds that of larger firms (Industry Canada, 2009). For 
instance, based on Statistics Canada’s data, Industry Canada (2009) reported that over 19,000 
firms spent more than $15 billion on R&D in 2005. Of these firms, 514 large firms accounted for 
57 percent of total R&D expenditures with an average of $17.6 million per firm while 16,886 
small firms contributed 25% with an average spending of $230,000 per firm.  It was also noted 
that R&D expenditure as a percentage of a firm’s revenue generally decreased as the firm size 
increased.  
2.2.1  Commercialization of product innovation 
Commercialization is an essential component of the innovation process that captures the value of 
innovation. In other words, commercialization is a process that turns the innovation or idea into a 
marketable product or service to realize a positive return from the investment in R&D. Indeed, a 
valuable invention or idea must have some commercial potential in which such innovative ideas 
can be brought to market in the form of products or services that satisfy consumers’ needs and/or 
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solve their problems (Toneguzzo, 2008). This suggests that it is important for innovations to 
address consumers’ needs or problems in order to be marketable.  
A Canadian panel of experts9
Getting new ideas to market is one of the most difficult steps in the innovation process because 
many innovations cannot go beyond the R&D stage for a number of reasons such as lack of 
production capacity, limited access to funding, the inability to create a demand and so forth. 
Graaff et al. (2002) point out that globalization has sharpened competition in many markets, 
requiring more management and engineering effort into product development and larger 
investment in market launch. Specifically, Hoban (1998) states that only one-third of new food 
products are successfully commercialized, which illustrates that the success rate for new product 
commercialization is very low. Therefore, it is worth noting that commercialization is at the 
intersection of innovation and entrepreneurship and comprises processes and activities that 
 on commercialization proposed that people and excellence are two 
main elements of commercialization (Industry Canada, 2006). In fact, without people no activity 
takes place while excellence refers to who wins in the face of emerging market opportunities 
through his/her commitment to building a highly skilled workforce, undertaking outstanding 
research, and making far-sighted investments. They also point out that successful 
commercialization has two sides: the supply of ideas and talented people and the demand from 
the marketplace for new products and processes. The panel believes that Canada has focused 
more on the supply side by increasing funding for the university research that results in 
knowledge and the talented people needed for commercialization. However, it has not paid much 
attention to the demand side to encourage businesses to engage in commercialization through 
reducing barriers and perceived risks. Generally, the panel identified three areas, namely talent, 
research, and capital on which the government of Canada needs to focus by preparing talented 
people, enhancing public and private research, and ensuring effective functioning of capital 
markets.  
                                                 
9 In May 2005, the minister of Industry appointed six experts to the non-partisan Expert Panel on Commercialization 
to identify how the Government of Canada could help to ensure continuous improvement in Canada’s 
commercialization performance.  
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connect economic value creation and economic value realization (Prebble, de Waal, and de 
Groot, 2008).  
The low success rate of commercialization may also show that the money spent on new product 
development is wasted and economic value is not created. Power et al. (1993), for example, state 
that approximately 46% of all new product development costs are spent on products which fail. 
In this regard, firms tend to spend less on R&D for developing new products. In particular, US 
food companies spend 1% to 4% of their gross sales on new product development 
(Hollingsworth, 1998). Similarly, the survey results of Statistics Canada (2005) showed that 
during the period between 2001 and 2003 about one-third of the 800 food processing companies 
studied allocated 1% to 5% of their annual gross expenditures for food manufacturing on 
innovation activities while 29% spent less than 1% and another 10% spent more than 6%. Also, 
results from the Survey of Innovation 2005 showed that 85.4% of Canadian manufacturing plants 
that developed innovations devoted 1% to 25% of the plant’s total expenditures to innovation 
activities during the period 2002 to 2004 (Uhrbach, 2009). However, investment in new product 
development is not always wasted because it can contribute to the knowledge creation within the 
firm; even if it fails.  
According to Andrew, Sirkin and Butman (2006), innovation is the process of developing ideas 
to realize payback and consists of three phases of activity: idea generation, commercialization, 
and realization. Of these, the commercialization phase is the most challenging for innovators 
because during this phase the company must evaluate the potential payback it could generate 
from its innovative idea and make important decisions with respect to the innovation business 
model, investment, management, company organization, etc. They note that besides generating a 
cash payback, the innovation process also brings indirect benefits that affect the company’s 
ability to generate cash later. These indirect benefits can be knowledge acquisition, brand 
enhancement, strengthened partners and associated organizations, and the organization’s 
prestige.  
 17 
Figure 2.1 depicts a cash curve as described by Andrew, Sirkin, and Butman (2006). The figure 
also illustrates four factors - start-up costs (pre-launch investment), speed (time to market), scale 
(time to volume), and support costs (post-launch investment) - that directly affect cash payback. 
In the figure, the horizontal axis reflects time and the vertical axis represents cumulative cash. A 
large pre-launch investment may enable a company to develop assets and capabilities required to 
commercialize and generate a large payback, whereas the post-launch investments ensure 
success of the commercialization and maximize the payback from the launched innovation. Post-
launch investments can be made in marketing and promotional activities, product improvements, 
and sales, distribution, and channel initiatives. Increasing speed and reducing time to market can 
increase payback by enabling a company to capture a larger market share at a higher average 
selling price and by starting the cash flow quickly. However, overly aggressive time to market 
may disproportionately increase development costs and negatively impact the quality of 
innovative products or the indirect benefits. Time to volume refers to the period from launch 



























Figure 2.1 A commercialization model – a cash curve  
Source: Andrew, Sirkin, and Butman (2006) 
 18 
Rosa and Rose (2007) adopted this cash curve as a commercialization model in their report on 
interviews with respondents in the Canadian business sector regarding the commercialization of 
innovation. They also emphasized that having sufficient financial capital to invest in the project 
is more important in the first two phases corresponding to idea generation and 
commercialization because this accelerates the transition period between these phases and also 
speeds up time to market, which facilitates successful marketing and future profitability. After 
the product is brought onto the market, the time to reach a profitability threshold of volume is 
another important factor that affects commercial success or failure. In fact, the sooner the 
product or service reaches the optimal production scale that enables a reduction in unit costs, the 
more quickly the firm will be able to generate profits. In the third phase of realization, the firm 
puts the emphasis on the profitability of investments that is, however, not always achieved in 
earlier years because of the incremental costs of technical support, advertising and development. 
Nonetheless, the firm may realize some indirect benefits, which could be one measure of 
commercial success, from the investment, through the exploitation of intellectual property rights 
via royalties on patents, copyrights, etc.  
Furthermore, Rosa and Rose (2007) also discuss a functional approach to commercialization that 
focuses on the basis of activities and functions on which the firm as well as the customer can act 
and provide feedback continuously regardless of the stage or sequences in the commercialization 
process. They did acknowledge that the commercialization process is an overlapping of complex 
functions that are not relevant to each firm because firms are quite different depending upon their 
sizes and fields or industries involved. Therefore, it is suggested that the commercialization 
model should be formulated in such a way as to fit the reality of each firm with its individual 
differences and needs instead of being set in one format.  
2.3   Supply chain theory 
A supply chain refers to the entire vertical chain of activities: from input suppliers, through 
production, processing, distribution, and retailing to the consumer. More specifically, it includes 
product life-cycle processes incorporating physical, information, financial, and knowledge flows 
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between actors in each stage of the product life-cycle that are linked to satisfy consumer needs 
and requirements (Ayers and Odegaard, 2008).  
Another concept, which is sometimes interchangeably used with the supply chain, is a value 
chain.  The value chain is a particular form of the supply chain, which refers to a vertical alliance 
or strategic network between a number of independent business organizations that share the same 
vision, common goals, mutual decision-making, risks and benefits within the chain (Hobbs, 
Cooney, and Fulton, 2000).  
Closs and McGarrell (2004) described supply chain management as “inter and intra-
organizational coordination of the sourcing, production, inventory management, transportation, 
and storage functions with the objective of meeting the service requirement of consumers or 
users at the minimum cost” (p. 8). In particular, the main objective of supply chain management 
is to optimize the performance of all of these functions within the chain at the least cost possible 
while adding as much value as possible (Jie, Parton, and Cox, 2007). Adding value is vital for 
supply chains as greater value may bring the chain members higher profits and return on 
investment. There can be many ways to add value to products. Novák, Fekete-Farkas, and Fejős 
(n.d.) suggest two main ways of adding value; innovation and improved coordination. Innovation 
focuses on improving existing processes, procedures, products and services or creating new ones 
while the second focuses on coordination among firms located at different levels of the supply 
chain.  
On the other hand, supply chain management tries to create competitive advantage in the chain 
by improving inter- and intra-organizational relationships (Windischer and Grote, 2003) in order 
to accomplish the main objective. Supply chains are competing with each other instead of 
individual firms to achieve competitive advantage for the whole supply chain (Heusler, 2003). 
This is especially true in the food industry. Novák, Fekete-Farkas, and Fejős (n.d.) argue that 
with a well-defined and well-functioning value chain, the chain members can realise many 
economic advantages that serve to sustain the long-term viable economic partnership of the 
chain. In particular, the value chain members can better influence the market and prices through 
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their cooperation and increased bargaining power, secure cash-flows of partners, reduce both 
economic and technological uncertainties, increase the income of the members by lowering and 
internalizing transaction costs with a better flow of information, efficient measurement methods, 
etc., decreasing production costs and achieving economies of scale, in some cases increase the 
technological and market efficiency, competitiveness of collaborating firms, carry out activities 
with a higher added value  and so on. Thus, effective supply chain management provides a major 
source of competitive advantage for the chain.  
Of course, supply chains differ by their practices of implementing supply chain management. 
Among the many aspects of supply chain practices, Li et al. (2005) distinguish six major 
dimensions: strategic supplier partnerships; customer relationships; information sharing; 
information quality; internal lean practices; and postponement. Strategic supplier partnership is 
the long-term relationship between the organization and its suppliers that helps all supply chain 
members achieve ongoing mutual benefits through the effective use of strategic and operational 
capabilities of individual members. Customer relationship includes a range of practices that are 
employed for the purpose of managing customer complaints, building long-term relationships 
with customers and improving customer satisfaction. Information sharing describes the extent to 
which information is communicated between supply chain partners. High information sharing 
enables members of the supply chain to understand the needs of end customers better and, hence, 
to respond more quickly to changing markets. Information quality includes accuracy, timelines, 
adequacy, and credibility of the information exchanged. While information sharing is vital, the 
quality of information is also important for supply chain success. Internal lean practices refer to 
eliminating all waste such as cost, time, etc. in manufacturing by using less inputs to produce at a 
mass production level, reducing set-up times, avoiding unnecessary steps in production, 
shortening lead times from suppliers, making consumer-pulled products just-in-time, etc. 
Postponement is the practice of moving one or more activities or operations to a later point in the 
supply chain. In general, there are three types of postponement: form, time, and place 
postponement. For example, the product form or the forward movement of goods can be delayed 
until customer orders have been received. 
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Fisher (1997) suggests that appropriate supply chains and strategies should be chosen depending 
upon product types such as functional and innovative products.  Functional products satisfy 
fundamental and stable customer needs and therefore have relatively long life cycles, low 
contribution margins, and intense competition. Innovative products, on the other hand, have 
unpredictable demand, high contribution margins, and short life cycles and thus involve high 
risks. While functional products should be delivered through an efficient supply chain focusing 
on minimizing physical costs, innovative products should be delivered through responsive supply 
chains which respond quickly to unpredictable demand by positioning inventory and production 
capacity in the right places to minimize costs of excessive supplies and obsolescence.    
2.3.1  Drivers for supply chain changes 
To achieve access to supermarkets and, consequently, successful commercialization, 
agribusinesses need to have a good understanding of the changes occurring in the agri-food 
industry and agri-food supply chains. Business and market environments change rapidly along 
with the pace of development. According to Konefal, Mascarenhas, and Hatanaka (2005), the 
current, retailer-driven restructuring of the global agri-food system has arisen from three 
important drivers: 1) the domination of concentrated international food chains; 2) the emergence 
of buyer-driven commodity chains, which has transferred power to retail chains; and 3) the 
growth of market differentiation and niche markets.  
Similarly, supply chains have been restructured. Ayers and Odegaard (2008) suggest the drivers 
for supply chain changes are innovation, extended product design, globalization, a flexibility 
imperative, process-centered management, and collaboration. They note that product innovations 
increase the value of products to customers, while process innovations decrease costs and 
improve service. Rising competition necessitates that extended product design include new 
features and services beyond the base or physical product to differentiate products from 
competitors. Examples of extended products are warranty, after-sale service, and financial 
services. Indeed, firms in the food retail sector need to continually innovate to stay competitive 
and maintain their market shares. Globalization increases diversified consumer demand and 
facilitates international trade through which firms are able to source their inputs and sell their 
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products and services across international borders to meet such diversified consumer demand. 
Flexibility imperative refers to the advantage gained from effective responses to the changes in 
the business environment such as market conditions, consumer preferences, and new technology. 
Process-centered management requires firms in the supply chain to focus on multi-company 
business processes for designing or improving organizations and systems that avoid local 
optimums at the expense of the overall system. Collaboration refers to intra- and inter-company 
cooperative efforts to meet mutual goals within the supply chain.  
Furthermore, Amanor-Boadu (2000) grouped changes in market environments into four principal 
categories: consumer priorities, product life cycles, business design/industry consolidations, and 
public policy changes. Due to changing consumer preferences and needs, suppliers of products 
and services need to consider consumer concerns about nutrition, health and food safety in their 
products, services, and production processes to maintain or build consumer loyalty, making their 
product/ service life cycles shorter and flexible. Businesses are re-organizing themselves and 
increasingly consolidating both horizontally and vertically to defend competitive positions or 
enhance competitiveness because of changes in government policies with respect to, among 
others, international trade liberalization, reductions of subsidies, alterations in safety nets, food 
safety regulations, and competition.  
Specifically, Hobbs (1998) identified some forces driving changes in supply chain relationships 
in the Canadian agri-food sector as increased consumers’ concerns regarding food safety, quality 
assurance and environmental sustainability, the reduction of barriers to international trade and 
investment, technological advances, and heterogeneous consumer preferences. Evaluating the 
effects of these factors on the coordination of supply chains in the framework of transaction cost 
economics, she concluded that these factors increased transaction costs and thus facilitated closer 
vertical coordination, particularly strategic alliances, in the agri-food chains.  
2.3.2  Supply chain partnering 
Supply chain partnering is the critical issue which affects the success and efficiency of a supply 
chain since supply chains are competing with each other, but not individual firms. Supply chain 
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members try to achieve the goals of providing high end-user value through an efficient use of 
resources and at the same time building competitive chain advantage (Novák, Fekete-Farkas, and 
Fejős, n.d.). Indeed, good inter-organizational coordination among supply chain partners enables 
supply chains to add high value at reduced cost. However, current trends in consolidation and 
growth of large supermarket chains have reduced partnership opportunities for small producers 
and manufacturers. These large supermarkets require a large volume of supply at a low as 
possible price. Small producers and manufacturers often suffer from high production costs 
because of their small plant size and constraints on financial and human capital. Instead, large 
producers and manufacturers can gain cost advantages due to economies of scale. Specifically, 
small manufacturers of innovative products have difficulty in supplying supermarkets due to the 
high risks associated with uncertain demand and quality of their new products in addition to a 
small volume of supply and high unit costs.  
Specifically, Michigan State University conducted a survey among 107 food manufacturers to 
determine the extent to which firms in the food industry value security in relation to quality, 
price, delivery reliability, and supplier location (Voss and Whipple, 2008). The survey results 
indicated that respondents attached high importance to delivery reliability, followed by price, 
location, product quality, and security when choosing between suppliers. This means that the 
producers and manufacturers who can supply a sufficient amount with consistency are preferred. 
In this regard, many small scale and start-up agribusinesses, who do not have previously 
established reputations and whose products are not well-known with respect to quality and 
consumer acceptance, are often regarded as unreliable. 
On the other hand, small innovative firms may create competitive advantages in supply chains 
through their involvement. Gellynck, Vermeire and Viaene (2006) emphasized that with their 
diversity and flexibility, SMEs may enhance the innovation potential of networks. This may be 
the case in the food retail sector where supply chains need to innovate continuously in order to 
compete effectively. Since SMEs differ in their ability to deal with the challenges of integration 
into value chains, different levels of integration may occur in the food sector, resulting in a 
segmentation of markets with different levels of excellence and regionalization (Fritz and 
Schiefer, 2008). More specifically, instead of integrating into the global food chains, SMEs with 
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lower levels of management excellence tend to remain restricted to local or regional markets 
with different needs and barriers related to horizontal cooperation or value chain integration, but 
also different needs for support (Fritz and Schiefer, 2008). They further state that the horizontal 
cooperation of SMEs is usually the base for an efficient integration into the vertical trade 
relationships of food value chains by strengthening their ability to become successful partners. 
Specifically, Metzger et al. (2010) examined three case studies of agribusiness ventures in Costa 
Rica and Bolivia that have included low income sectors (LIS) into their chains with the purpose 
of reducing poverty. They found three major factors contributed to successful inclusion of LIS 
by the three ventures studied: consistent business models, sources of competitive advantage, and 
the actions taken to overcome barriers to LIS inclusion. First, each commercial enterprise 
designed a business model that was consistent with LIS incorporation. For example, in the case 
of the Tierra Fertil program of the CSU supermarket chain of Costa Rica, the chain started to 
purchase produce from small farmers instead of buying from market middlemen, which enabled 
it to source fresh produce with variety valued by customers and, therefore, can be sold at higher 
prices.  
Second, each agribusiness chain built one or more sources of competitive advantage. The Terra 
Fertil, for instance, obtained competitive advantage in superior quality, freshness, hygiene, 
safety, and a combination of product attributes that was created through the acquisition of 
produce from geographically dispersed small farmers, introducing safe, hygienic packaging, and 
improving transportation.  
Finally, each company took some actions to overcome barriers associated with LIS inclusion that 
differed by cases depending on a particular barrier. The three case studies revealed significant 
barriers to LIS inclusion generally, including logistical barriers, lack of organization among 
small producers, lack of technical knowledge of growing quality products, and cultural distance. 
These barriers were overcome by investing in infrastructure, providing technical training to 
producers through partnerships with NGOs and other actors, building trust through close 
relationships with small farmers, and paying premium prices to reward product quality and on-
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time delivery. They argued that LIS inclusion in agribusiness value chains may contribute to 
building competitive advantage and creating economic value for the firm and the LIS as well as 
non-economic value for society.  
2.4   Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics asserts that vertical coordination between different stages of a supply 
chain such as production, processing, distribution, and retailing can be analyzed by a transaction 
cost approach. In fact, the characteristics of the transaction and level of transaction costs affect 
the choice of vertical coordination along the supply chain. Vertical coordination can be viewed 
as a continuum from spot market relationship to vertical integration. More specifically, Hobbs 
(1997) stated that, in between the two extremes of spot market and vertical integration, there are 
a number of ways of coordinating economic activities, including informal buyer-seller 
transactions, strategic alliances, formal written contracts, joint ventures, and franchise 
arrangements.  
In spot markets, there are many buyers and sellers exchanging homogenous products at 
competitively determined market prices. Further, there are no ex-ante and ex-post relationships 
between sellers and buyers and, thus, transaction costs seem to be low for search goods, but high 
for credence goods10
                                                 
10 Search goods are the goods whose characteristics can be observed before a purchase as there is perfect 
information about quality, such as freshness, colour, smell, ripeness, in the market of search goods, while the quality 
of credence goods cannot be directly observed by consumers even after consumption (McCluskey, 2000).   
. Under vertical integration, two or more stages of the supply chain are 
brought together by common ownership and management and transactions between these stages 
are organized internally within the firm. According to Amanor-Boadu and Martin (1992), a 
strategic alliance is the network of firms that cooperate to accomplish a common objective by 
sharing the resulting risks and benefits and mutually controlling decision-making processes. Two 
or more firms form a joint venture to coordinate economic activities together by contributing 
equity that represents their shares in revenues, expenses, assets and the control of the company. 
Formal written contracts and franchise arrangements are other types of agreements made 
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between transaction partners. Many kinds of buyer-seller relationships may be established 
between transaction partners depending on their specifications, transaction costs and the 
characteristics of transactions.   
Transaction cost economics recognizes that economic activities or transactions do not occur 
without friction; in other words, there are transaction costs to carry out any exchange. 
Transaction costs are defined by Arrow (1969) as “the costs of running the economic system” (p. 
48).  Transaction costs consist of three components: information costs, negotiation costs, and 
monitoring or enforcement costs (Hobbs, 2005). Information costs arise prior to the transaction 
and involve the costs of obtaining data and processing it into information about products, prices 
and customers that can be made available for decision making. Negotiation costs arise from the 
physical exchange of goods or services such as negotiating, drawing up contracts, etc. 
Monitoring or enforcement costs arise after the transaction is carried out and include costs of 
arbitration, of litigation, of monitoring quality of goods, and so on.   
Transaction cost economics is more micro-analytical and, hence, regards a business firm as a 
governance structure and a transaction as the basic unit of analysis, relying on its core 
assumptions about bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity (Williamson, 1986). 
Bounded rationality assumes that human agents tend to be rational when making transaction 
decisions, but their capacities to evaluate all the situations are limited and thus they spend time 
and incur costs in obtaining and processing information. Furthermore, human agents are capable 
of opportunism, which assumes that individuals act in their self-interest and could exploit a 
situation to their own advantage. As a result, there is always a risk of opportunism which needs 
to be taken into consideration when making decisions on governance structures. Transaction cost 
economics places a considerable emphasis on the degree of asset specificity in an exchange 
relationship. Asset specificity is a transaction specific investment which arises when a party to an 
exchange has invested in resources specific to that exchange, with little or no value in an 
alternative use (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 2002). As asset specific 
investments are vulnerable to the other party opportunistically attempting to appropriate rent 
from the investment, the investing party may be subject to a holdup problem by the other party. 
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Hence, if transactions involve more specific assets, a higher degree of vertical coordination is 
more likely to result due to the risks of opportunism. 
Asset specific investments may take the form of specialized physical assets, specialized human 
assets, site specificity, dedicated assets or brand name capital (Williamson, 2002). Physical asset 
specificity relates to special-purpose equipment, specialized investments required for scale 
economies, specialized content and packaging of food products for particular buyers. Site 
specificity is created when buyers and sellers locate facilities close to each other to reduce 
transaction costs. Human asset specificity arises from firm-specific training or learning by doing. 
Dedicated assets are large discrete investments made in expectation of continuing business. In 
the seafood industry, for instance, specific physical assets could be a filet machine for salmon, or 
specific content and packages for retailers’ private label products such as President’s Choice. In 
addition to these forms of asset specificity, Tveterås and Kvaløy (2006) identify temporal 
specificity that relates to the timing of delivery and its effect on product value. For example, 
when a buyer cancels a purchase on short notice, investments in perishable products like fish 
become transaction specific due to difficulty in finding alternative processors within the short 
framework dictated by perishability.  
Transaction attributes that have important ramifications for determining governance structures 
are asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. Since even complex contracts are inevitably 
incomplete due to bounded rationality, there is always uncertainty which suggests adaptive needs 
(Williamson, 2002). It seems that a low level of uncertainty in a particular transaction results in 
spot market governance; on the other hand, a high degree of uncertainty, ceteris paribus, is more 
likely to induce vertical integration. Firms with high transaction frequency tend to choose closer 
vertical coordination to reduce transaction costs. According to Williamson (1986), at whatever 
frequency, transactions of standardized goods that require no specific investment by either party 
would be most cost effectively organized using a spot market relationship. In contrast, the 
recurrent transactions of non-standardized goods in which one of the parties has invested in 
mixed and highly idiosyncratic assets are best coordinated by hierarchies (vertical integration). 
For example, transactions between sheep producers and the only lamb processing company in a 
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particular region could be coordinated by vertical integration when the company invests in 
equipment or a production facility that is specific to processing lamb.   
Changes currently occurring in the agri-food sector affect the nature of a transaction, which in 
turn influences transaction costs. Drivers for these changes include socio-economic, 
technological, and regulatory factors (Hobbs and Young, 2000). The socio-economic factors are 
increasing consumer concerns about food safety and quality and environmental sustainability of 
production. For instance, in the German fish sector, increasing consumer concerns for quality, 
safety and environmental sustainability of seafood products were the driving forces for closer 
vertical coordination, particularly in supply chain networks (Gagalyuk, Hanf, and Steinbauer, 
2009). Consequently, governments tighten their regulations on food safety, environment, and 
other aspects of the regulatory system while retailers seek closer vertical coordination with 
suppliers to ensure food quality and safety. However, drivers for change in food safety 
regulations differ from country to country. For example, the initial drivers for the food safety 
regulation in the UK were primarily related to a need to restore consumer trust in response to the 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, while incentives for Australia and Canada 
were related to maintaining or strengthening export competitiveness in response to the growing 
food safety requirements of trading countries (Hobbs, Fearne, and Spriggs, 2002). In short, 
tightening regulations raise costs for producers and processors, putting more pressure on the need 
for financial capital.     
In addition to public standards, after the BSE crisis in the EU in the 1990s, retailers began to 
impose private standards along their supply chains to ensure food safety since they faced direct 
risks associated with food safety failures. As a consequence, vertical coordination between 
producers, processors, and retailers has become an important means to assure food safety and 
quality. Moreover, retailers have been developing their own name brands, and products sold 
under their brand labels must meet specific food safety requirements and be produced through 
specific production processes. Giraud-Heraud and Soler (2006) emphasize that retailers’ chain 
brands cause a very profound change in vertical coordination between retailers and the upstream 
part of the chains, shifting away from a spot market relationship to a closer relationship in which 
specific agreements are concluded between retailers and producers. For example, Carrefour, a 
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multinational retail chain, makes supply agreements directly with producers through which it 
imposes its private standards including complete traceability and other safety and quality 
requirements (Codron, Giraud-Heraud, and Soler, 2005).  
As retailers can impose different private standards, producers and manufacturers may run into a 
holdup problem with the retailers. Producers and processors may need to invest in introducing 
food safety systems, such as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP), traceability 
systems, recall systems, communication systems, and even new technologies, and in training of 
employees for the technology and environmentally friendly production practices. Once a supplier 
makes this kind of investment as required by a particular retailer, its investment becomes asset 
specific to that particular retailer. In this case, the supplier will be subject to opportunism by the 
retailer and it will be costly to switch to another retailer. Therefore, un-harmonized private 
standards seem to be another barrier to commercialization by small agribusinesses by requiring a 
large asset specific investment and, thus, increasing risks of opportunism.  
Moreover, food processing is increasingly concentrated because of technology that enhances 
productivity, characterized by high capital intensity and economies of scale. Technology makes 
transactions more transaction specific by requiring asset specific investments, specific types of 
inputs, specifically skilled labour, etc. Accordingly, economic activities have become more 
complicated and involve risks. Hence, processors also prefer closer vertical coordination with 
input suppliers and retailers to secure their asset specific investments. Small food processors are 
not as technology intensive as medium-sized and large food processors, but they still have to 
possess sufficient capital to realize economies of scale.  
Since bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity are present in the current economic 
environment, transaction cost economics focuses on determining a governance structure for a 
particular transaction economizing on the sum of production and transaction costs. The changes 
in the economic environment and in transaction attributes are leading to closer vertical 
coordination and thus supply chains are becoming more integrated. Wysocki, Peterson, and 
Harsh (2006) argue that an integrated supply chain has many benefits, such as inventory 
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reduction throughout the chain, reductions in supplier redundancy, reduced transaction costs, 
frictions and barriers, increased functional and procedural synergies between chain members, 
faster response to changing market demands, lower operating and investment costs across the 
chain, shorter product realization cycles, and lower product development costs.  
2.5   Factors related to commercialization success 
Acknowledging the vital role of innovation management for both companies and supply chains, 
Graaff et al. (2002) distinguish five categories of factors influencing success and failure of 
innovation and innovation introduction: technological competency, organisational competency, 
marketing competency, tactical introduction decisions, and managing cooperation. The first four 
categories are at the level of the innovation project and the firm, whereas the last category refers 
to factors at the supply chain level that influence inter-organizational relations within the supply 
chain.  
Their first three categories - technological, organisational, and marketing competencies - adopted 
from Cobbenhagen (1999) make up managerial competencies that explain a company’s 
competitive advantage.  Technological competencies include knowledge and experiences of 
technologies, possession of installations to develop technologies and the capacity to adopt new 
technologies. Marketing competencies include knowledge of markets and market strategy, a 
company’s reputation, the availability of sufficient resources for market development and the 
ability to seize market opportunities by identifying consumers’ needs and preferences as well as 
by addressing their problems. Organizational competencies include the company’s structure and 
culture that promote innovation by stimulating creativity and being progressive, flexible, and 
product- and market-oriented. The fourth category, tactical introduction decisions, refers to the 
actual introduction and the logistical aspects of introduction in which decisions regarding the 
marketing mix of a new product such as price, product, promotion and distribution are made 
(Graaff et al, 2002). All of these groups of factors seem to be important for small innovative 
agribusinesses to successfully introduce new products into commercial markets.  
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Further, Graaff et al. (2002) tested the importance of these factors empirically through a single-
case study in the Dutch horticultural sector. They used the so-called innovation score card as a 
checklist for interviews undertaken with several supply chain participants and experts within 
government and research institutes. The innovation score card described both the importance of 
factors and the impact of supply chain participants with respect to innovation and the 
improvement opportunities per factor and per supply chain participant. Results of their study 
showed that a supermarket was considered to be the most important participant in the 
horticultural supply chain because of direct contact with consumers and its market power, 
followed by a specialty shop and a seed supplier, a growers co-operative and a processor, auction 
and a wholesaler, and lastly a grower and distribution centre supermarket. Moreover, technology 
was the most important factor in innovation for the seed supplier, the grower, and the processor 
whereas all supply chain participants needed to improve co-operation for successful introduction 
of innovation. This finding indicates that cooperation is the most critical factor to foster 
innovation and ensure successful commercialization of an innovation.  
Both inter- and intra-organizational cooperation and coordination are equally important for the 
successful commercialization of innovation. Commercialization of product innovation, in 
particular, requires well-coordinated team work in which all departments of an organization as 
well as suppliers, distribution channels, and customers effectively work together in order to 
achieve successful outcomes. For instance, results of a study in the Thai food processing industry 
by Suwannaporn and Speece (2003) indicated that efficient internal communication among the 
new product development team, such as R&D, manufacturing, and marketing functions, effective 
strategy and planning, and more extensive use of marketing research in the new product 
development process did indeed result in higher success rates in new product introduction. On 
the other hand, inter-organizational relations such as supply chain cooperation have become a 
potential success factor in the current agri-food marketplace (Amanor-Boadu, 2000). Indeed, in 
the agri-food sector, effective supply chain cooperation can provide competitive advantage to 
maintain and/or gain market share.  
In addition to cooperation, factors related to barriers that small innovative agribusinesses face 
when commercializing new products affect the success of the commercialization. Small scale or 
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start-up agribusinesses seem to face more challenges when commercializing their new products 
than existing and/or large scale firms as they lack knowledge and experience. To commercialize 
new products small scale or start-up agribusinesses need to establish supply chain relationships 
or integrate into existing supply chains. Hobbs, Cooney, and Kerr (2000) suggest that the 
challenges faced in developing supply chains in infant industries are insufficient volumes, 
inadequate supply chain infrastructure, inconsistency of supply, inconsistent quality, uncertainty, 
absence of price discovery, unavailability of market information, need for new competencies, 
access to financial capital, and regulatory constraints. Many similar challenges are faced by 
small agribusinesses when developing or entering supply chains because the current market 
environment and institutions do not seem to favour them.  
The Survey of Innovation 2005 conducted by Statistics Canada determined the degree of 
importance of obstacles to the development and commercialization of innovation as indicated by 
innovative manufacturing plants, which comprised 65% of the sample of 8902 manufacturing 
plants in Canada (Uhrbach, 2009). Obstacles to the development of innovation ranked according 
to their importance were inability to devote staff to innovation projects on an on-going basis, 
lack of internal funds for innovation, lack of qualified personnel to work on innovation projects, 
high innovation costs, lack of outside financing, difficulty in finding cooperation partners for 
innovation, risk related to the feasibility of the innovation project, and lack of information on 
technology. Starting from the highest importance, the obstacles to commercialization of 
innovation were: uncertain demand for innovative goods or services; a market dominated by 
established firms; an insufficient marketing effort; lack of knowledge of markets; inappropriate 
targeting; lack of consumer acceptance; lack of industry-wide standards; inappropriate 
packaging; and lack of government standards and regulations. More generally, it is noted that 
good management skills, vision, a highly qualified workforce, scientific and technological 
discovery, and access to capital at each stage of a company’s life are vital for successful 
commercialization (Industry Canada, 2006). 
Small innovative agribusinesses face most of these barriers in addition to barriers specific to their 
size and features of business when developing and commercializing new products. In connection 
with their small size, small agribusinesses often lack financial capital, available production 
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facilities and knowledge of marketing, business management, and entrepreneurship. Also, 
agriculture influences the activities of agribusinesses in some ways as it is the only source of 
primary inputs for agribusiness. For instance, Metzger et al. (2010) point out that three features 
associated with agricultural production, such as perishability of raw materials, seasonality of 
supply (harvests), and variable product quality create challenges for small producers wishing to 
be accepted as business partners. Generally, the literature suggests that when commercializing 
new products, small innovative agribusinesses are more likely to encounter barriers: lack of 
financial capital; lack of human capital; high costs of commercialization; high unit costs of 
production; high transaction costs; risks of uncertain demand for innovative products; lack of 
knowledge of the market and industry; changes in regulations and lack of harmonization of 
private standards; low opportunity of partnering; etc.  
Small agribusinesses have to finance initial investments in sample production and test marketing 
in addition to production facilities and inputs, but they usually lack financial capital. With 
sufficient financial capital, small agribusinesses are able to accomplish the commercialization by 
speeding up time to market and time to reach the optimal production scale. However, small-scale 
and start-up firms usually do not have sufficient internal funding to finance commercialization of 
new products. Also, they have with little or no credit history and lack tangible assets to secure a 
loan so that access to credit is limited compared to larger and existing firms. For example, lack 
of financing from outside the plant for innovation was indicated by two thirds of nearly 5,800 
innovative manufacturing plants surveyed in Canada (Uhrbach, 2009). This confirms that finding 
external funding may be even harder for small agribusinesses. As a result, they tend, for the most 
part, to use informal sources of financing such as personal savings and loans, credit cards, and 
loans from friends and relatives. According to SME Financing Data Initiative (2009), for 
instance, in 2007 start-up SMEs primarily used informal sources of financing as 73 percent of 
them used personal savings to finance their company, compared with 54 percent of all SMEs11
                                                 
11 This report on Key Small Business Financing Statistics - December 2009 used the results of the Survey on 
Financing of Small and Medium Enterprises, 2007 by Statistics Canada that covered 1.6 million SMEs in Canada 
(SME Financing Data Initiative, 2009).  
. 
Also, 51 percent of start-up SMEs used personal and commercial loans from financial 
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institutions to fund their operations while 64% of all SMEs used personal and commercial loans 
to finance their current activities. Moreover, start-up SMEs also used other formal financing, 
such as lease financing (12 percent) and supplier credit (12 percent), less often than established 
SMEs that used retained earnings (57 percent), lease financing (22 percent) and supplier credit 
(21 percent).  
In addition, small firms developing new products or services are likely to encounter more 
reluctant lenders because of the perceived risks associated with high development and 
commercialization costs associated with innovative products and uncertain demand for the 
products. For example, according to Statistics Canada (2005) 28% of nearly 560 food processing 
companies that developed innovations tried to raise capital specifically for innovation; however, 
only about two-thirds succeeded in reaching their target funds while others failed. Riding and 
Orser (2007) noted that in 2004 the primary lending institutions for funding of SMEs in the 
prairie provinces of Canada were chartered banks and credit unions that received 49% and 34% 
of loan applications respectively. Furthermore, small and start-up agribusinesses may not attract 
venture capital investments. Indeed, venture capital investments are mainly limited to a small 
number of companies in the technology sector that have high growth potential (SME Financing 
Data Initiative, 2009). 
The food retail sector throughout much of the world is becoming increasingly consolidated, 
which poses challenges for small agribusinesses wishing to enter supply chains and partner with 
these large retailers. For example, the top five chains in the U.S. accounted for over 60 percent of 
food sales (Brown and Sander, 2007). In Canada, 60.3% of retail food sales are made by grocery 
store chains (AAFC, 2009). The consolidation of retailers has provided market power to control 
suppliers and to push the costs and risks down the supply chain (Brown and Sander, 2007). In the 
food retail sector of Canada, a market concentration ratio, which is expressed as the market share 
of the top four food retailers, increased from 67% in 2004 to 74% in 2006 (AAFC, 2008). Much 
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of this increase can be attributed to Metro's12 acquisition of A&P13
Moreover, due to the pressure from consumers, supermarkets have begun to implement private 
standards throughout their agri-food chains to satisfy quickly changing consumer preferences 
and to ensure food safety and quality. Some have developed their own private standards that go 
beyond the mandatory regulations required by law while others require third party certification 
such as GlobalG.A.P
 in 2005 while others 
consolidated because of rising competition sharpened by well-financed entrants such as Wal-
Mart and Costco (AAFC, 2008). Hence, small agribusinesses need to supply a large volume to 
access these large supermarket chains, which increases their costs and risks in addition to the 
risks related to uncertain demand for innovative products.  As a result, small innovative 
agribusinesses have a very low opportunity to partner with large retailers and have access to 
large distribution chains. 
14
Besides costs of development and production, small producers also face high transaction costs to 
commercialize their new products. Transaction costs associated with marketing new products via 
supermarket chains may include costs of complying with a supermarket’s specific standards and 
. Through private standards or third party certification food retailers 
require producers to apply certain production practices and to produce products with specific 
attributes and, therefore, small agribusiness firms incur higher costs to comply with retailers’ 
requirements. These may include initial costs including certification costs and investments in 
food safety facilities and in control systems, and recurrent costs to maintain the food safety 
requirements during the supply period. Therefore, stringent regulations and lack of 
harmonization of private standards, particularly heightened requirements of supermarkets are 
acting as a further barrier for small agribusinesses to access commercial markets by requiring 
more investments.  
                                                 
12 Metro Inc. is the third largest food retailer in Canada that operates 558 stores in Ontario and Quebec provinces 
(AAFC, 2009). 
13 A&P Canada was a supermarket chain.  
14 GlobalG.A.P is a pre-farm-gate standard covering the process of the certified product from farm inputs until the 
product leaves the farm and serves as a practical manual for Good Agricultural Practice (G.A.P) around the world 
(GlobalG.A.P, 2010).  
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requirements, time and resources spent on negotiation and delivery, delays in payment, fees, 
transportation costs, etc. Specifically, there are many kinds of fees paid to access supermarket 
chains, including substantial slotting fees which increase the unit cost of a new product. 
According to the definition of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (2003), slotting 
allowances or slotting fees are lump-sum, up-front payments from a supplier to a retailer to 
initially place its product on the retailer’s shelves or to access to the retailer’s warehouse space. 
Based on their study undertaken in the cases of seven retailers and eight suppliers in the US, the 
FTC (2003) reported that the average amount of slotting allowances for five product categories 
(fresh bread, hot dogs, ice cream and frozen novelties, shelf-stable pasta, and shelf-stable salad 
dressing) studied ranged between $2,313 and $21,768 per item, per retailer, per metropolitan 
area. Also, it was noted that a nationwide introduction of a new grocery product in the US would 
require $1.5 to $2 million in slotting allowances.  
In addition, Bloom, Gundlach, and Cannon (2000) describe many other types of fees associated 
with marketing products via retailers: presentation fees paid for the privilege of making a sales 
presentation; display fees paid for special merchandising and display of products; pay-to-stay 
fees paid to continue stocking and displaying a product; and failure fees paid when a product 
does not meet expected goals. All of these suggest that these fees could be substantial enough to 
hinder small agribusinesses entering into large supermarket networks. 
Also, transportation costs are high when selling the products to distantly located retailers. 
Transporting small quantities or perishable products increases the costs further and, hence, large 
quantities are preferred. Besides directly selling to retailers there are many other options to 
market the products such as via distributors, brokers, and the internet. Transaction costs differ 
significantly depending on distribution channels chosen. The internet can provide small 
agribusinesses an opportunity to do marketing among geographically-dispersed customers with 
relatively low costs and, thus, to increase sales without being restricted to local markets. 
However, dealing with customs and duties may increase transaction costs for international sales 
in addition to online security, delivery systems, and quality assurance of products that need to be 
solved to facilitate online sales (Hobbs, Boyd, and Kerr, 2002).  
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Many entrepreneurs in the agribusiness sector lack skills and knowledge of marketing, 
management and entrepreneurship that are essential to the success of commercialization of 
innovation. For instance, Graaff et al. (2002) found out that, for processors in the Dutch 
horticulture sector, marketing was the most important activity in the introduction of innovation. 
Moreover, adequate knowledge of the market and industry where new products are going to be 
introduced is essential to successful commercialization. More specifically, processors need to 
target proper markets or consumers through understanding of consumer needs and preferences or 
market requirements and devote sufficient effort to marketing. Good knowledge of the industry 
makes it easier to enter and establish good relationships with supply chain members. On the 
other hand, some small agribusinesses cannot even attract qualified personnel due to relatively 
low wages, being located in rural areas, or simply lack of qualified human resources in the local 
labour market, etc.  
2.6   Summary 
Given limited resources and the needs of an ever-increasing world population, innovation is the 
most efficient way to boost productivity and economic growth. Indeed, innovation not only 
brings benefits to the innovating firms and direct consumers but also to society in general. Small 
scale firms make up a large part of businesses in Saskatchewan and have potential for more 
innovation with their diversity and flexibility. Thus, the commercialization of new products by 
small agribusinesses influences the competitiveness of the agri-food industry by enhancing value 
added activities.  
Commercialization is the most significant and challenging phase of the innovation process that 
enables firms to generate a positive return from the investment in innovation. Commercialization 
is costly and requires large pre-launch and the post-launch investments that speed up time to 
market and time to volume respectively. Small innovative agribusinesses lack internal funding to 
finance commercialization of innovation as well as to having limited access to external financing 
because of the high risks associated with the high costs of the commercialization of innovation 
and uncertain demand for a new product. Qualified human resources that can manage 
commercialization activities, make investment decisions, and conduct thorough studies about the 
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market, are essential to achieving successful commercialization. However, small agribusinesses 
also lack qualified personnel and the entrepreneurs themselves often do not have adequate 
managerial skills and knowledge of marketing and entrepreneurship. Due to lack of knowledge 
of the market, small agribusinesses may target inappropriate markets or consumers without 
properly identifying their needs and preferences and also may undertake inappropriate marketing 
strategies and activities. Therefore, high costs of commercialization, lack of human and financial 
capital, and poor knowledge of the market may be key barriers to successful commercialization 
of product innovation by small agribusinesses.  
Supply chain theory and transaction costs economics provides important insights into the 
commercialization of innovation, particularly identifying and investigating the factors related to 
commercialization success and barriers faced by small scale, innovative agribusinesses in 
entering supply chain relationships. Further, these approaches can assist in the development of an 
economic model of commercialization and the design of strategies for small agribusinesses.  
Supply chains are competing with each other to gain competitive advantage for the chain, and 
thereby market shares, in the current competitive market environment. Product differentiation 
and cost efficiency are important strategies. With this perspective, small agribusinesses can be 
potential business partners in supply chains with high value-added, innovative products that are 
consistent with the objectives of supply chains, but they face a number of barriers to accessing 
supply chains. In particular, small manufacturers of innovative products have a difficulty in 
supplying supermarkets due to high unit costs and transaction costs, the high risks associated 
with uncertain demand and unrecognized quality of their new products. Given the small size of 
available production facilities, or even no production facility being available, small 
agribusinesses incur high production costs besides the large costs of development and 
commercialization of new products. Meanwhile, as a result of the changes in supply chain 
relationships, which are fostering closer vertical coordination and concentration, small 
agribusinesses have low opportunities for partnering with supermarkets. In brief, the literature on 
supply chain theory suggests that high unit costs, transaction costs, risks of uncertain demand for 
innovative products, and low partnering opportunities are the primary barriers to 
commercialization, particularly for small innovative firms accessing established supply chains.  
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From the perspective of transaction cost economics, the current changes occurring in the agri-
food sector raise transaction costs in many stages of the product life cycle by creating asset 
specificity and, thus, risks of opportunism. As a result, a higher degree of vertical coordination 
tends to dominate in agri-food chains because it reduces transaction costs and allows supply 
chains to respond to rapidly changing market demand. This, however, facilitates industry 
consolidation and concentration, largely in the retail sector, which in turn has reduced 
partnership opportunities of small firms in the supply chains. Together with stringent regulations 
and private standards that are not harmonized, small volumes of supply, unknown product 
quality, and seasonality of agricultural inputs make transaction costs higher for small innovative 
agribusinesses as well as their transaction partners. Therefore, based on the literature regarding 
transaction cost economics, high transaction costs, changes in regulations, and lack of 
harmonization of private standards are likely to be the main barriers to commercialization for 
small agribusinesses.  
All in all, a firm’s ability to deal with all of these barriers has a major impact on the success in 
commercializing new products. On the other hand, small agribusinesses need to effectively 
cooperate and communicate with their partners since increasing closer coordination in the agri-
food chains has made cooperation within the chains of increasing importance.  
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CHAPTER 3:   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter presents an economic analysis of the commercialization process for a product 
innovation by small agribusinesses. A firm can suffer from not generating a sufficient return 
from their investment in a new product. This may take different forms from sustaining losses, 
meaning the business is simply not viable for the firm, to being profitable, but remaining too 
small to provide the entrepreneur with an adequate living.  Thus, two scenarios such as making a 
loss and making an insufficient profit are taken as representative situations faced by small 
agribusinesses in the early stage of commercialization of new products. The economics of 
commercialization of new food products by small agribusinesses is modelled using graphical 
analysis for these two situations starting from the early stage of commercialization up to the 
stage of realizing available economies of scale. In the models, commercialization refers to stages 
from pre-launch through launch to full commercialization where firms realize payback.   
Supply chain theory and transaction cost economics are used to explain the concepts and the 
reasoning of the models although the models are rooted in standard neoclassical 
microeconomics. The models specifically deal with new food products that can be marketed to 
retail chains. A market for innovative food products is assumed to be imperfectly competitive.  
3.2   Choosing size of production facilities - Ex ante options and ex post rigidities 
Product innovations result in new or significantly improved products that have no perfect 
substitutes; however, there are likely some imperfect substitutes for them. When goods are of 
equal value to the consumer, goods are perfect substitutes for each other. In contrast, imperfect 
substitutes are goods that are sufficiently similar that they can be used for the same purposes, but 
are different in ways that reflect consumer preferences. The latter refers to product 
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differentiation, which is viewed as a source of market power and a potential source of 
competitive advantage. In the food processing industry, in particular, firms often devote 
considerable resources to devising new food products that differ from those of their competitors.  
Depending on the particular industry, most new products, which by being new imply they are 
differentiated, are sold in imperfectly competitive markets in which firms administer prices of 
their products and determine sales based on demand15
At the start of the commercialization of new products when the product is introduced into the 
market, small innovative firms are likely to be restricted to selling at a local or niche market 
where they can sell only a small volume. This is known as a cottage industry in which small 
firms carry out small scale production that is often home based. Therefore, the size of innovative 
firms’ production facilities in the early stage of commercialization is likely to be small due to 
capital constraints, the high risks associated with unknown demand and the restricted venues 
where the product can be sold (e.g. a farmers’ market). In this stage, some firms may not even 
own production facilities but instead use new product development and processing facilities that 
are small-scale and available for use at a fee. The result is that the amount produced by small 
firms in the early stages of commercialization may mean that the firm incurs a high average cost 
. Given an imperfectly competitive market 
structure, innovating firms in the food processing industry operate in a business environment 
characterised by monopolistic competition as a large number of small and medium-sized firms 
exist in the business environment. Whereas firms in perfect competition sell an identical product 
and are price takers, firms in monopolistic competition sell a differentiated or innovative product 
and, thus, have some power over setting price. Since other products in the market are close but 
not perfect substitutes for new products, which are unique in their characteristics or uses, each 
innovating firm faces a downward sloping demand curve and has some degree of discretionary 
pricing power over its own product. Consequently, the firm is able to charge a monopoly price, 
setting its production at the point where marginal revenue equals to marginal cost – the profit 
maximizing output level.  
                                                 
15 This is in contrast to producers in perfectly competitive industries where firms are “price takers” – because all 
products are perfect substitutes and the individual firm’s demand curve is perfectly elastic.  
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– its production is too small to reap any economies of scale. As a result, due to the small size of 
their production facilities, it is not possible to supply, for example, supermarket chains that 
require large quantities of supply at a low price and possibly have more stringent food safety and 
quality standards. Indeed, the average cost of small firms will rise further as they increase their 
outputs because they face ‘U-shaped’ marginal and total average cost curves corresponding to 
the small size of their production facilities. Therefore, a different size plant is normally required 
to achieve a larger volume of outputs at a lower cost. 
The crux of the matter is the relationship between ex ante (before the production facility is built) 
projections of sales and ex post (after the production facility is built) production costs. The 
average cost curve associated with any production facility that has already been built is U-














Figure 3.1 An average cost curve and plant’s capacity  
The minimum point on the U-shaped average cost curve is the output level denoted by 
economists as the plant’s capacity16 – Qc. Output level Qc has an average cost associated with it 
that is the lowest average cost achievable with a plant of capacity equal to Qc (e.g. Cmin
                                                 
16 Note the economists’ use of the term capacity is different than the common English meaning of capacity. In 
common English the term capacity is associated with the maximum output a production facility can produce.  
). If the 
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output choice of the firm is not at Qc, say Q1, given this already built plant, the average cost rises 
to C1, where C1 > Cmin. A similar rise in average cost is associated with the firm choosing an 











, remembering that the plant has already been built.  
In economic theory it is assumed that there is the possibility of engineering a production facility 
that is tailored to any capacity – a unique production facility can be built for any capacity. Figure 
3.2 illustrates three different capacities that a plant can have, each with the same minimum 
average cost.  
 
Figure 3.2 Average cost curves of a firm’s plant tailored to any capacity 
Having infinite potential production facility sizes leads to the question of which size of 









Figure 3.3 A small commercializing firm’s situation prior to building a production facility 
The answer depends on the firm’s expectations regarding its potential market. As shown in 
Figure 3.3, the firm’s cost structure and the market cannot be known because there is no 
production possible prior to building the production facility unless it uses co-packing plants. The 
solution, based on forecasts of sales, is to build a production facility with a capacity that matches 
expected sales. This will minimize costs for the expected sales volume. Indeed, the firm can 
attain the lowest average costs of production at the output level where all capacity is utilized. A 
plant’s production capacity matching expected sales volume is described in Figure 3.4 where Qc 





Quantity Qe = Qc 
AC 
Cmin 
 is expected sales. 
 
Figure 3.4 Plant’s capacity matching expected sales volume  
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Building a production facility with a capacity different from the expected sales volume will lead 











Figure 3.5 A plant’s capacity exceeding expected sales volume  
If for an expected sales volume Qe, a firm chooses to build a production facility Qc to produce 
Qe, the average cost would be C1, and greater than Cmin. This will be true for all production 
facilities that do not have a capacity equal to Qe
3.3   Economies of scale  
.  
The previous discussion takes no account of economies of scale – it has assumed constant returns 
to scale. Economies of scale refer to “the reduction of long-run average costs resulting from an 
expansion in the scale of a firm’s operations” (Ragan and Lipsey, 2005, p.185). As a firm 
expands its scale of production from the small-sized plant – often suitable for a cottage industry-
sized market - to a medium-sized or large plant, it can produce the larger output with a lower 
average cost. Indeed, the firm’s short-run marginal and total average cost curves shift down as 
larger production facilities are built. In particular, a larger firm tends to invest in modern 
techniques of production that lower production costs by increasing capacity of production and 
thus spreading its fixed costs over a greater volume of output – economies of scale is largely 
determined by technological factors.  
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Small firms introducing new food products may encounter two possible situations. First, a small 
commercializing firm selling its product in a cottage industry-sized market makes a small profit 
that is just enough to survive due to high costs associated with its small-plant size and the small 
demand of, for example, a local or niche market. The firm is not sustainable unless it can expand 
its operation and enter into a market with a larger demand. While profitable, such a small scale 
operation simply does not provide a “living” for the entrepreneur. Alternatively, a small 
commercializing firm cannot make a positive profit because its costs are high given its small 
scale production. In this case, the firm cannot be in business for long and be successful in 
commercializing its new product. In order to examine the relationship between the cottage 
industry-based market equilibrium of a small commercializing firm and the situation where the 
potential for economies of scale exist, a comparative static partial equilibrium approach is 
applied in this thesis. The comparative static partial equilibrium approach deals with a particular 
commodity and assumes that effects of other markets are negligible and can be safely ignored in 
the analysis.  
Figure 3.6 illustrates the first case in which a small firm makes a small profit, which is equal to 
the area a, because a monopoly price Pm is a little higher than the average total cost of producing 
quantity Qm. The firm can choose its price as its new product is unique, meaning it has no perfect 
substitutes. Thus, the firm has a downward sloping demand curve D0 that is restricted to a 
cottage industry-sized market (e.g. a local or niche market). Each short-run average total cost17 
(SRATC) curve is drawn for a given plant size; from a plant size appropriate for a cottage 
industry having a short-run average total cost curve, SRATC0, to a large plant size having a 
short-run average total cost curve, SRATC2
                                                 
17 Note the firm’s transaction costs are not included in the short-run average total costs (SRATC).  
. The SRATCs exhibit economies of scale. Short-run 
average total cost curves and corresponding marginal cost curves (MC) have a ‘U-shape’ and 
show how costs vary if quantity of production varies.  
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Figure 3.6 Case 1 - A low profit making firm and economies of scale  
The long-run average cost curve (LRAC) encloses a series of short-run average total cost curves 
by being tangent to them (Ragan and Lipsey, 2005). The level of output at the tangency between 
each short-run average total cost curve and long-run average cost curve shows the level of output 
for which the plant size is optimal. Since most fixed costs such as managerial and administrative 
costs do not increase in proportion to the increase in production, the firm’s long-run average 
costs fall until output reaches Q2. Along the long-run average cost curve from the quantity Qm to 
Q2, the firm experiences economies of scale. The quantity Q2 
To justify the building of a facility with capacity to produce output Q
is the firm’s most efficient scale 
where the firm attains its lowest possible average cost of production for the available technology 
and factor prices.  
2, the firm must face a 
commercial market demand that includes a regional or national market’s demand except for the 
demand of a cottage industry-sized market. This commercial market demand can often only be 
achieved by getting integrated into supermarket supply chains. In this regard, the firm needs to 
achieve the supermarket’s derived demand for the new product, which is given by D*, as the 













supermarket’s derived demand is the demand for its inputs. The supermarket’s derived demand 
for the new product can be calculated by deducting all its costs and profits from consumer 
market demand for the product. However, the models assume that transaction costs associated 
with a new product have not been deducted from the supermarket’s derived demand for the new 
product. Thus, the firm should aim to reach the quantity Q2 where it realizes all of its available 
economies of scale and is able to enter a fully commercial market, escaping the limits of a 
cottage industry-sized market. If the firm increases its production scale greater than Q2, the firm 
starts to experience diseconomies of scale due to rising costs. Production scales beyond the scale 
of producing Q2 are known as the area of decreasing returns to scale or diminishing returns to 
scale.  
The second case is depicted in Figure 3.7. Area b reflects the loss incurred by a small firm 
commercializing a new product because the average total cost of producing quantity Qm is higher 
than the monopoly price Pm
 
.  
Figure 3.7 Case 2 - A loss-making firm and economies of scale 












Similar to the previous case, the small firm cannot produce the quantity Q2 in the small plant size 
they have in the early stage of commercialization. In case 2, the firm is not viable in its early 
stage of commercialization because a profit cannot be made given that the firm’s optimal output 
is Qm
3.4   Modelling commercialization for small innovative firms 
. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the potential solution to both situations is to capitalize on 
economies of scale, thereby attaining a lower unit cost. As unit costs decline, the possibility of 
accessing commercial markets is enhanced. With small plant size, firms will never be able to 
supply the large supermarkets that purchase a large volume at a price that will be lower than the 
firm receives in a cottage industry-sized market. Indeed, a cottage industry-sized small firms’ 
average cost of production is likely much higher than the price a supermarket offers.  
From the perspective of supermarkets, they prefer to engage in transactions with a few large 
firms instead of a large number of small firms because of transaction costs. Indeed, supermarkets 
always seek ways to reduce their costs, thereby lowering prices to remain competitive in a 
market with aggressive rivals. As a result, large supermarkets also try to capitalize on economies 
of scale to effectively reduce transaction costs. Generally, supermarkets incur considerably 
higher transaction costs when handling a number of small suppliers than a few large suppliers 
since small firms usually supply a small volume. The volume can often only be supplied on an 
intermittent basis. In particular, supermarkets face high information costs if they must screen the 
reliability of all small suppliers and the quality of their products. They also face consistently high 
negotiation costs to write contracts with small firms. The monitoring costs of supermarkets tend 
to be much higher than the other two transaction costs because they have to pay more attention to 
food quality, safety and security to maintain consumer trust and royalty. Monitoring costs can be 
the costs of dealing with delivery delay, incorrect quantities, and quality control as well as 
enforcing standards, traceability, and labelling requirements.  
Most transaction costs are fixed, which means such costs do not depend on the volume of a 
transaction. For example, supermarkets will spend relatively the same time and resources to 
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write contracts with suppliers regardless of how much they are going to supply. Accordingly, if 
the volume of supply increases, unit costs of transactions will decrease. Thus, supermarkets offer 
prices to their suppliers based on how much they pay for procuring products, including 
transaction costs and at what price they can sell these products in the market. In other words, 
supermarket’s willingness to pay suppliers depends upon volume of supply. It is possible that a 
supermarket does not wish to enter into transactions with a supplier if the quantity supplied is not 
sufficiently large to reduce unit cost of the transaction to the point that generates an acceptable 
profit margin for the supermarket.  

















 is the supermarket’s willingness to pay the supplier - it shows how much the supermarket 
is willing to pay at different quantities supplied by the firm.  
 
Figure 3.8 A supermarket’s willingness to pay a supplier 
The supermarket’s transaction costs, TC, can be depicted by the gap between the commercial 
demand curve and supermarkets’ willingness to pay the supplier. The supermarket will not offer 
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any price, even a low price, until the firm supplies the quantity Q1 where the unit cost of 
transaction is equal to TC1.  From the point Q1, the supermarket starts to offer a very low price 
for the product that rises little by little as the quantity supplied by the firm increases and, 
therefore, the unit cost of the transaction decreases. The unit cost of the transaction decreases 
from TC2 to TC3 when the quantity of supply increases from Q2 to Q3. Consequently, the 
supermarket’s willingness to pay the supplier grows slightly from P2 to P3
 
.  
Figure 3.9 shows the economic model of commercialization by a small, low-profit making firm. 
It models how the firm can move from the early stage of commercialization in a cottage industry 
to the stage of full commercialization where it utilizes its available economies of scale. Average 
and marginal costs of the firm and transaction costs of the supermarket are also described in the 
figure.  
Figure 3.9 Case 1- Commercialization of a low-profit firm  
The demand curve of the cottage industry, such as a niche market at which the firm is marketing 
its new product, is given by D0. Utilizing all available economies of scale where the firm faces a 
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marginal cost curve, MC*, and a short-run average total cost curve, SRATC*, the firm is able to 
achieve sales levels that are defined by a supermarket’s derived demand curve, D*
The firm can attain its lowest possible average cost of production at Q
.  
The firm cannot engage in transactions with a supermarket until it supplies the quantity Q´ 
because the supermarket’s costs of handling this small quantity of transactions are very high. The 
firm also incurs transaction costs, for example, slotting fees, costs of complying with standards 
and supermarket requirements, when marketing its product through the supermarket chain in 
addition to the high unit cost of production. However, the firm’s transaction costs are not 
included in the figure as these costs vary from firm to firm depending on their characteristics. If 
the firm supplies a large volume, its unit costs of transaction will also decrease.  
c - the optimal capacity of 
the firm’s production facility where all available economies of scale have been realized. With the 
production facility of capacity Qc, the firm can maximize its profit by producing the quantity Q* 
where MC* equals the price P*, which the supermarket is willing to pay its supplier at the 
quantity Q*. Accordingly, the firm can earn a supernormal profit18, which is equal to the area c. 
The supernormal profit is sufficient to provide the entrepreneur with a return to his/her 
entrepreneurial input thus justifying his/her continued interest in production.  
If the firm increases its production facility size to a capacity larger than Qc, its average cost of 
production will rise due to diseconomies of scale although its average transaction cost may 
decrease slightly. This, overall, will push the firm’s average total costs including transaction 
costs up and lead to a loss. So the firm should aim to achieve the quantity Q* 
The economic model of commercialization by a small, loss-making firm is depicted in Figure 
3.10. The model shows how the firm can move from the early stage of commercialization in a 
to successfully 
commercialize its new product and realize a sufficient positive return.  
                                                 
18 Supernormal profit is a profit above the normal profit that is necessary to keep an entrepreneur in his current 
business (Black, Hashimzade, and Myles, 2009).  
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cottage industry to the stage of full commercialization where it utilizes its available economies of 
scale. It also illustrates average and marginal costs of the firm and transaction costs of the 
supermarket. The relationship among these terms can be explained in the same way as case 1. 
However, this firm faces more challenges than the firm described in case 1 to achieve its 
intended quantity Q* and, thus, has to devote more efforts to it. Similarly, when the firm has the 
production facility with capacity of Qc and produces and supplies the quantity Q*
 
, it can make a 
supernormal profit equal to the area d.  
Figure 3.10 Case 2- Commercialization of a loss-making firm 
While exercising economies of scale, the firm may also further enhance its profitability through 
increasing the supermarket’s willingness to pay. In other words, the firm may influence the 
supermarket’s price by taking some actions to reduce the supermarket’s transaction costs. For 
example, the firm could introduce a more reliable delivery schedule that reduces the 
supermarket’s risks of delayed inputs and uncertainty or a quality control system that lowers the 
supermarket’s costs of screening the quality of the product. As these kinds of costs, which are 
mostly fixed, are removed from the supermarket’s total transaction costs, the unit costs of 
transactions will be lower for all volumes of supply. This makes it possible to shift up the 
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supermarket’s willingness-to-pay-a-supplier curve. However, these kinds of efforts to reduce the 
supermarket’s transaction costs are likely to increase the firm`s own transaction costs. Therefore, 
the firm has to make their decisions weighing the increase of the supermarket’s price and the 
costs of the efforts.  
 
Figure 3.11 A supermarket’s willingness to pay a supplier 
Figure 3.11 describes a shift in a supermarket’s willingness-to-pay-a-supplier curve as a result of 
changes in the unit cost of a transaction. The firm that has the production facility of capacity Qc 
generates the profit equal to area e at the profit maximizing quantity Q*1 before taking measures 
to decrease the supermarket’s transaction costs. If the supermarket’s total transaction costs 
decrease, the unit costs of the transactions will go down for all volumes of supply and, hence, the 
curve depicting the supermarket’s willingness to pay the supplier moves up from WTPs1 to 
WTPs2. Specifically, the supermarket’s unit cost of the transaction associated with handling Q*1 
goes down from TC1 to TC2, which raises the supermarket’s willingness to pay the supplier from 
Ps1 to just below Ps2. Consequently, the firm can increase its profit to area f by supplying Q*2 at 
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3.5   Challenges of commercialization 
These two cases suggest that small commercializing firms can be successful in marketing their 
new products in a commercial market by capitalizing on economies of scale. Economies of scale 
make it possible to attain the lowest average costs of production. However, in practice, how to 
achieve that scale of production is the “big question” asked by many small agribusinesses. 
Basically, they have to overcome challenges of commercialization, particularly those associated 
with achieving economies of scale and accessing supermarket chains. Based on the literature 
review and the commercialization models of small firms developed in this chapter, three major 
challenges associated with commercializing via retail chains are identified and listed in Table 
3.1. Each challenge includes particular barriers that contribute to the challenge.  
The first challenge is that a small firm needs to increase its production scale to meet retail 
requirements (e.g. from Qm
 
 to Q*). This challenge can be comprised of many barriers, for 
example, lack of financial and human capital and high costs of commercialization. Both lack of 
internal funding and limited access to credit are major barriers for small agribusinesses, 
particularly the firms that are making a loss compared to the firms that could finance some, even 
a small part, of the commercialization costs with their small profits. Lack of human capital such 
as unavailability of qualified personnel who perform tasks associated with engineering, 
managing and planning a large plant as well as the manager’s poor managerial skills and 
knowledge of marketing blocks successful commercialization.  
High costs of commercialization such as investments in building a larger production facility are 
another barrier that raises risks and makes lenders reluctant to provide credit to small 
agribusinesses. The high failure rate in commercialization of new products also deters private 
investors from investing in risky ventures like small, commercializing agribusinesses. Therefore, 
small agribusinesses may not attract venture capital investments. Given these barriers, the time to 
reach the profitability threshold of volume Q* increases, which reduces the firm’s ability to 
generate profits. 
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Table 3.1 Challenges and Barriers to Commercialization 
CHALLENGES AND BARRIERS  
1. INCREASING PRODUCTION SCALE   
1.1. Lack of financial capital  
1.1.1. Lack of internal funding(c)  
1.1.2. Limited access to credit(a,b)  
1.1.3.    Lack of venture capital   
1.2. Lack of human capital   
1.2.1. Lack of qualified personnel(c)  
1.2.2. Lack of knowledge of management, marketing, and 
entrepreneurship  
 
1.3. High costs of commercialization   
2. ACCESSING COMMERCIAL MARKETS  
2.1. High unit costs   
2.2. High transaction costs   
2.3. Changes in regulations and un-harmonization of private 
standards(c) 
 
2.4. Low opportunity of partnering(c)  
2.5. Lack of knowledge or experience of the industry(c)  
3. DEFINING THE OPTIMAL PRODUCTION SCALE    
3.1. Risks of uncertain demand for innovative products(c)   
3.2. Lack of knowledge of the market(c)  
Source: a Hobbs, Cooney, and Kerr 2000; b Industry Canada 2006; c
Accessing a commercial market is the second challenge. Generally, the unit cost of production is 
not low enough compared to the low price the firm receives from the supermarket. In figures 3.9 
and 3.10, the small firms can make supernormal profits once they reach the optimal production 
scale Q
 Uhrbach 2009 
c and supply profit maximizing output Q*; however, these models do not include 
transaction costs associated with marketing through supermarkets – costs that may raise the unit 
cost of the products significantly for firms. Changes in regulations and lack of harmonization of 
private standards pose a further barrier by raising the firms’ transaction costs. For instance, if 
supermarkets impose different standards that require investments specific to a particular 
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supermarket, firms’ transaction costs will rise due to risks of asset specificity. Accordingly, high 
costs of production and transaction costs hinder small agribusinesses’ ability to partner with 
supermarkets that are very concentrated and have market power to push prices down. This is 
clearly shown in the figures 3.9 and 3.10 in which the small firms have almost no opportunity to 
engage in transactions with supermarkets except for supplying at least the quantity Qc
3.6   Conclusions 
.  
Defining the optimal production scale is the third challenge. This challenge incorporates barriers 
such as risks of uncertain demand for innovative products and lack of knowledge of the market 
and industry. It is hard to determine the demand for new innovative products because there are 
no consumer experiences, statistics and studies available upon which a reliable projection of 
demand can be made. This also raises the firm’s information costs. As a result, 
commercialization of new products involves high risks. For instance, there is a possibility of 
errors in forecasting expected sales and thus optimal plant size. On the other hand, small 
agribusinesses lack adequate understanding or knowledge about the market and industry, which 
creates barriers to successful commercialization. For example, without the adequate knowledge 
or understanding of consumer needs and preferences small agribusinesses could make an 
unreliable projection of demand, target inappropriate markets or consumers, and produce 
products with unacceptable quality.  
Importantly, Table 3.1 can be used as a checklist by small agribusinesses prior to 
commercializing their new products. The commercialization checklist may help small 
agribusinesses to understand the challenges and barriers to commercialization and, thus, to find 
ways to overcome the challenges. 
The two economic models of commercialization that determine how small agribusinesses could 
achieve commercial markets from the early stage of commercialization through realizing 
available economies of scale are developed. In the early stage of the commercialization of new 
food products, small innovative firms are often restricted to a cottage industry-sized market, 
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selling a small volume. The models are based on the assumption that commercial markets can be 
achieved by taking advantage of economies of scale.  
Moreover, the commercialization checklist designed for small, start-up agribusinesses is 
developed. Based on the commercialization models and the literature, three main challenges of 
commercialization such as increasing production scale, accessing the commercial market, and 
defining optimal production scale were identified in the checklist. Increasing production scale is 
the primary challenge for small innovative agribusinesses because it provides the base for 
overcoming two other challenges. To effectively utilize available economies of scale and 
determine their optimal production scale, small innovative firms need at first to forecast their 
expected sales volume – a speculative process at best. It is a major challenge due to uncertain 
demand for innovative products and raises their information costs. Also, small commercializing 
firms likely have to deal with the reluctance of large supermarkets given the low prices they are 
willing to pay and the high requirements if the firms are to gain access their supply chains.  
Supply chain theory and transaction costs economics help explain the challenges of 
commercialization. Transaction costs play a significant role in supermarkets’ decisions with 
respect to the prices they are willing to pay as well as in small firms’ decisions when attempting 
to access supermarket chains to distribution their products. As supermarkets’ transaction costs 
associated with engaging in transactions with commercializing firms decline, their willingness to 
pay their suppliers is likely to increase. What can a small commercializing firm do to enter the 
commercial supply chain? It is probably necessary for the firm to increase its production capacity 
to the level where it utilizes available economies of scale and receives a price from supermarkets 
which allows it to make a profit. This level of production may make it possible to generate a 
sufficient profit to maintain a firm’s sustainability in the long run. Finding ways to lower the 
transaction costs associated with entering supply chains is also likely required. Hence, the 
transaction cost approach is applied to analyze case studies on commercialization of small 
agribusinesses. Achieving economies of scale means that building a much larger production 
facility than was suitable for a cottage industry-sized market. This may entail considerable 
financial challenges and risks.  
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In addition to paying more attention to transaction costs, supply chain management needs to be 
considered when analysing how to reach the output that enables a firm to achieve integration into 
commercial supply chains. An understanding of the principles of supply chain management 
assists small agribusinesses in finding ways to enter formal supply chain relationships as 
potential partners.  
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CHAPTER 4:   ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIALIZATION IN SMALL 
SASKATCHEWAN AGRIBUSINESSES 
4.1   Introduction 
In this chapter two case studies of small Saskatchewan agribusinesses are presented. Prior to 
introducing the cases, the methodology for the case studies is discussed. A case study is an 
accepted approach for qualitative research to analyze research questions in depth and provide 
researchers with an opportunity to choose various methods for data collection. Data for the case 
studies were collected through interviews and reviews of written documents. In accordance with 
pre-prepared questions, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the president and the 
manager of two food processing companies to document their commercialization performance 
and reveal the factors influencing the successes and failures of commercialization.  
Two cases are reported in detail including the introduction of the companies, information about 
the industries they were involved in, and the development and commercialization of new 
products. Following descriptions of the cases, a case study analysis is discussed in the context of 
the economic models of commercialization and proposed challenges of commercialization, 
drawing upon supply chain theory and transaction cost economics.  
4.2   Methodology 
A case study approach is employed to research the successes and failures of commercialization 
in small Saskatchewan agribusinesses. Denscombe (2003) notes that “case studies focus on one 
case (or a few cases) of a particular phenomenon with a purpose of providing an in-depth 
account of events, relationships, experiences or processes occurring in that particular case” (p. 
32). Unlike other approaches such as a survey, the case study approach covers a small number of 
observations or cases and studies research questions as they naturally occur without introducing 
artificial changes or controls (Denscombe, 2003).  
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The strength of the case study approach includes the use of a variety of methods for collecting 
data depending on the circumstances and the specific needs of the situation (Denscombe, 2003). 
There are four major methods of gathering data for case studies: interviews, questionnaires, 
observation and review of documents. A good case study should include multiple sources of 
evidence (Yin 1994). Interviews are one of the most important sources of case study data. The 
range of available interview techniques includes structured, semi-structured, unstructured, one-
to-one, group interviews, and focus groups (Denscombe, 2003). Structured interviews involve 
tight control over the format of the questions and answers and the pre-determined form of the 
answers make it easy to analyze (Denscombe, 2003). Semi-structured interviews also have a 
clear list of questions or issues to be discussed, but the answers are open ended and thus the 
interviewee is allowed to elaborate on points of interest (Denscombe, 2003). In this regard, semi-
structured interviews are conducted to reveal the factors influencing the success and failures of 
commercialization. Yin (1994) also suggests that audio recording of the interviews may be more 
effective for interpreting responses accurately.  
Questionnaires consist of a written list of questions designed to collect information about the 
points with which the research is interested (Denscombe, 2003). Information collected through 
questionnaires can be used as data for analysis. Alternatively, observation draws on the direct 
evidence from events rather than relying on what informants tell the researcher (Denscombe, 
2003). Two types of observation used in social sciences are systematic and participant 
observation. While systematic observation is associated with social psychology and produces 
quantitative data, participant observation is mainly associated with sociology and anthropology 
and usually produces qualitative data (Denscombe, 2003). Finally, documents are an important 
source of data and of which written documents, such as books and journals, website pages and 
the internet, newspapers and magazines, records, letters and memos, diaries, government 
publications and official statistics, are commonly used in social sciences (Denscombe, 2003). 
Of these, methods of interviews and reviewing written documents are used to collect data for this 
study. With flexibility of questions and open-ended answers, semi-structured interviews provide 
an opportunity to gather qualitative and case-specific information that cannot be obtained by 
questionnaires. The observation method is not suitable for this study because the economic 
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outcomes of a long commercialization process that occurred in the past are analyzed in the case 
studies.  Hence, semi-structured interviews and follow-up interviews were conducted in this 
thesis with the managers of two food processing companies in Saskatchewan. The interviews 
followed a set of questions (Appendix B) designed to document the companies’ commercial 
performance in the marketing of new products and further to reveal the factors influencing the 
successes and failures of commercialization by small agribusinesses. The questions posed to the 
interviewees were intended to guide the participants and to garner their lessons and thoughts on 
commercialization strategies and integration into supermarket chains. The interviews were semi-
structured; allowing the interviewees to elaborate points of interest and, thus, in some cases, the 
discussion strayed from the expected scope of the interview questions depending on the nature of 
the response. Also, available written documents about the companies and industries are reviewed 
to further provide evidences for the case studies. 
In order to achieve the research objective of analyzing factors affecting the successes or failures 
of commercialization by small agribusinesses, the criteria that the participants’ companies should 
be small-scale and have commercialized, or attempted to commercialize, new food products 
within the last decade were used. From a membership directory of the Saskatchewan Food 
Processors Association (SFPA)19 a few potential companies were identified. However, upon 
reviewing business plans prepared by students at the University of Saskatchewan, two companies 
were contacted by phone notifying them of the researcher’s intent to contact the organizations’ 
personnel for an interview and were selected based on their acknowledgement and consent of the 
interview request. A template of the interview consent form is included in the Appendix A. 
Confidentiality was promised to all research participants20
                                                 
19 Saskatchewan Food Processors Association is a non-profit organization formed by food processors with the 
objective of supporting food processing through providing its members with management and marketing programs 
and services (SFPA, 2011). 
20 Approval of the study’s procedures for data collection, use, and storage as well as protecting confidentiality of 
research participants was granted by the University of Saskatchewan’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board on 
November 9, 2010. 
. The researcher approached the 
participants individually in order to limit any feelings of coercion to participate or not 
participate. The interviewees permitted the interviews to be audio recorded. The audio recording 
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was used is assisting the researcher in interpreting responses accurately. The interviewees were 
allowed to decline to answer any particular question(s).  
4.3   Case studies 
Two case studies of small Saskatchewan agribusinesses, Classic Meats and Canadian Prairie 
Lamb, were undertaken. The personal interviews were conducted with the president of Classic 
Meats and the general manager of Canadian Prairie Lamb between November and December, 
2010. Responses from the interviews were reported in a case study format.  
4.3.1  Classic Meats 
Introduction 
Classic Meats was established in south western Saskatchewan in 2004 to introduce a value added 
meat product to the North American market. The company brought to the Canadian market a 
relatively innovative product - “meat on a stick”. It is a virtual company and thus contracts out its 
processing to co-packing plants. The president is a majority owner of Classic Meats. The 
company has two other partners who have shares and provide financial advice and assistance.  
Snack and convenience food industries 
As its products can be used as snacks or meal replacement, the company competes in both the 
snack and convenience food industries.  Competition in the snack and convenience food 
industries is intense so that effective marketing strategies based on branding, advertising and 
promotion, effective distribution, product quality, and price are crucial for successful 
commercialization (AAFC, 2007). In particular, promotion and shelf placement play important 
roles because snack and convenience foods have very low brand loyalty (AAFC, 2007). 
Notwithstanding increased competition, production has been increasing (AAFC, 2007). For 
example, as measured by manufacturing shipments, the output of the snack food industry in 
Canada grew by over 60% from $1 billion in 1995 to $1.64 billion in 2003 (AAFC, 2007).  
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Further, the industry provides high value added products to the economy. In 2003, value-added 
in the snack food industry was about 60% of the total value of shipments, which was much 
higher than the 35% average for the food and beverage sector over the same period (AAFC, 
2007).  
Canada has over 25,000 convenience stores that traditionally sell fuel and tobacco in addition to 
food products (AAFC, 2010).  Typically, fuel sales account for 60% to 70% of their total sales, 
while cigarettes and groceries sales both account for 15% of total sales (AAFC, 2010). As a 
result of general decreases in tobacco sales sector-wide, the industry is paying more attention to 
the grocery segment and specifically focusing on attracting the under 30 year old consumers who 
usually seek convenience (AAFC, 2010).  
Having realized the potential of the convenience stores, distributors and wholesalers are 
beginning to consider small growers, packers and producers as key suppliers (AAFC, 2010). 
Indeed, independent convenience stores can compete effectively because of superior locations 
and by offering specialized products, like fresh and pre-cooked foods. Hence, convenience stores 
may be an excellent distribution channel to introduce new fresh foods given their customers’ 
loyalty (AAFC, 2010).  
Development of the product 
The president of Classic Meats had worked on a meat quality project with an Australian group 
for 15 years. The objective was to add value to meat products. He then came up with an idea for 
producing a snack product from meat. Starting in 2003, he has worked on developing and 
bringing this product to the Canadian market.  
The president of the company talked about his new product with personnel from the 
Saskatchewan Food Processors Association and a team was designated to conduct market 
research on the viability of the product. The president said that the team found that there could be 
considerable potential for the product in the North American market because at that time there 
was only one similar product, namely pork on a stick, in the US.  
 65 
Consequently, he brought his idea to the Food Centre21
The president indicated that the N.Y. Stick has been well received by consumers. For instance, 
according to a survey conducted by the Delta Force Marketing Team
 at the University of Saskatchewan. They 
agreed to assist in developing the new product. The president and his partners named the new 
product New York Stick (N.Y. Stick) because they considered the product has the same quality 
as a New York Steak. The Food Centre developed the first N.Y. Stick, Spiced Beef. Since raw 
products were purchased and supplied by Classic Meats, the Food Centre charged only for 
equipment and labour.  
The N.Y. Stick is fully-cooked meat on a stick, frozen, and vacuum-packed and is 
microwaveable. The product can be used as a snack or meal for some time-pressed consumers to 
eat on the run, which makes the product innovative. The product is most suitable for convenience 
stores as it is pre-cooked and is ready to eat in about 45 seconds when heated in a microwave. It 
is higher in protein than most other snacks and ready-to-eat products such as sandwiches.  
22
After attending a trade show in Toronto, Ontario in September 2004, the president realized that it 
was impossible to find distributors and/or retailers willing to carry only one product due to the 
large transaction costs associated with single product lines. Therefore, he asked the Food Centre 
to develop other products with different flavours and made of different kinds of meat. 
 in 2006, 90% of a total of 
97 consumers in Saskatchewan, who sampled the N.Y. Stick, found the product good to excellent 
while 63% indicated that they would buy it again (Bauche et al., 2007). Also, the president of the 
company tested consumer acceptance of the products by giving his products to a few 
convenience stores and truck drivers along the highway in Saskatchewan. The president said that 
he always got positive feedback.    
                                                 
21 Saskatchewan Food Industry Development Centre Inc. (Food Centre) is a non-profit organization established as a 
partnership between Ministry of Agriculture, the Saskatchewan Food Processors Association and the University of 
Saskatchewan and provides food processors one-stop, full services to assist in the development of new food products 
(Food Centre, 2011).  
22 Delta Force Marketing Team is a group of students at the University of Saskatchewan who carried out the survey 
during a course on AgEc 347.3- Agribusiness Marketing Management.  
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Eventually, three more N.Y. Stick products: BBQ Pork, Southwest Chicken, and Mediterranean 
Chicken were developed.  
As of the end of 2010, Classic Meats had spent around $250,000 on product development and 
marketing.  The president and his partners financed half of the development cost and this funding 
was dedicated to the development of Spiced Beef. According to the president of Classic Meats, 
the remaining funding was sourced through provincial government grants for product 
development through the Agricultural Council of Saskatchewan.  
Commercialization 
After having overcome the challenges of nutritional value, labelling, and packaging, they 
believed the product was ready to go to market. However, Classic Meats faced the much greater 
challenge of getting into the commercial market.  
While N.Y. Sticks were being made at the Food Centre, the representative of a national food 
distributor saw the products and was interested in discussing distribution of the products. Hence, 
in July 2004 the distributor met with the president of Classic Meats and expressed their interest 
in distributing N.Y. Sticks into their client convenience stores across Canada. According to the 
president of Classic Meats, the distributor was willing to pay 10% less than a local grocery store 
– a client of Classic Meats. As such, the distributor would sell N.Y. Sticks to the convenience 
stores, at a mark-up of about 55%. Once the product was sold to the distributor, the distributor 
would be responsible for marketing and, thus, store shelving fees. However, the owners of the 
company believed that they could market their products themselves and, thus, declined the offer.  
A small chain of convenience stores in Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) wanted to carry N.Y. 
Stick products in 2005. However, Classic Meats would have incurred large transaction costs in 
addition to high marketing costs of advertising and promotions. Expected transaction costs 
included transportation costs relative to other marketing channels, shelving fees, potential 
damage loss during transportation, a risk of delivery delay, and the president’s travel costs, etc. 
For example, Classic Meats had to pay shelving fees of approximately $6,000 to get onto the 
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listings of the stores. Hence, the president indicated it was impossible to accept the offer due to 
high marketing and transaction costs.  
In May 2005, one of the largest food distributors in western Canada wanted to take the trademark 
of N.Y. Stick exclusively, paying a small royalty on each stick sold. They were afraid that once 
the distributor had the trademark, it could make similar products modifying the formulations of 
N.Y. Sticks and not pass on the royalties. The main problem was how to balance the future 
returns from the products and control over the products. Classic Meats did not want to lose 
control of the products and, therefore, refused the offer. At that time, the company lacked 
experience and legal advice. Later on, they realized that they could have made a good contract 
that secured sustainable returns from the trademark by specifying a particular volume that 
needed to be sold each year for a certain period.  
The president of Classic Meats talked to a couple of the store managers of an international 
convenience store chain about stocking N.Y. Sticks. In 2007, N.Y. Sticks were carried in five 
stores of the chain in Saskatchewan (Bauche et al., 2007). The retail price was twice that paid to 
Classic Meats (Bauche et al., 2007). Since the sales volume was not large, the president of 
Classic Meats decided to meet with the president of the Canadian chain in an attempt to expand 
sales. The president of the national chain expressed an interest in carrying the products. The 
president of Classic Meats subsequently submitted a proposal to the provincial president of the 
chain to distribute N.Y. Sticks throughout Saskatchewan. Unfortunately, the provincial president 
refused his proposal because he overstepped the boundaries of the company’s management by 
selling to those stores in Saskatchewan without first talking to the Saskatchewan president. The 
president of Classic Meats emphasized that if you want to introduce new food products, be aware 
of the appropriate way in which to approach a company that respects the potential customer’s 
business model, otherwise your relationship with the company can be destroyed.   
In 2007, a business plan was completed for Classic Meats by students of the University of 
Saskatchewan. The business plan examined the financial viability of expansion if Classic Meats 
accepted the offer of the national food distributor, who wanted to distribute N.Y. Sticks to 
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convenience stores throughout Canada. The business plan assumed that Classic Meats contracted 
with the Saskatchewan Toll Processing facility23
Another food distributor in Saskatchewan distributed N.Y. Sticks for a short period, but sales 
were also not strong, likely because the distributor did not have enough storage and trucks with 
coolers to accommodate a large volume.  Further, it appeared that the stores the distributor sold 
to did not make any effort to sell the products. Specifically, the president indicated that the 
advertising signs promoting N.Y. Sticks provided by Classic Meats were not displayed in some 
of the stores when he stopped by. Indeed, N.Y. Sticks are not as visible as shelf stable products 
 to produce the products and 70,080 sticks 
would be sold in each year. The forecasted result indicated that Classic Meats would lose money 
over the next ten years (Bauche et al., 2007). It was determined that the total revenue the 
company would earn could only cover the cost of goods sold, but not the administration, 
marketing and general expenses. In particular, the unit costs of N.Y. Sticks made up over 80% of 
the sale price to the distributor and would be about 130% over the sale price if it included 
administration, marketing and general expenses (Bauche et al., 2007). Hence, the price Classic 
Meats would receive from the distributor was too low to cover costs and even to make positive 
returns unless a larger volume than was assumed could be sold.  
Nevertheless, Classic Meats sold to the national distributor at that price for a short period. N.Y. 
Sticks were distributed to convenience stores located in Saskatchewan and Ontario, but sales 
were not as large as expected. The reason for this failure is still unclear. Given the perceptions of 
the products by consumers, the reasons for the poor sales may relate to an ineffective marketing 
program in attracting new consumers and/or lack of effort by the distributor in marketing the 
products. The president of Classic Meats believed that with a large volume they could reduce the 
unit costs of the products to the level that generated a sufficient profit at the price offered by the 
national distributor.  
                                                 
23 Saskatchewan Toll Processing Centre (STPC) established by the Saskatchewan Department of Agriculture and 
Food operates within the facility of Thomson Meats Ltd. (TML) located in Melfort, Saskatchewan to provide start-
up meat processors toll processing services.  
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because they need to be placed in a freezer. Therefore, advertising signs were essential to inform 
customers that a new product was available.  
As the Food Centre could only produce small volumes of N.Y. Sticks, Classic Meats contracted 
with the Saskatchewan Toll Processing facility in 2008 to produce N.Y. Sticks in a larger 
volume. A few batches of sticks of each flavour were produced, but there were problems with the 
production process. For example, the colour of the products was pale and the taste was not the 
same as the original flavour developed in the Food Centre. Since the packaging was not sealed, 
these products could not be sold and, thus, were given to the Food Bank. As a result, a lot of 
money was wasted, which put a further burden on the firm’s finances.  
Classic Meats has supplied, for most part, a cottage industry sized market since the introduction 
of N.Y. Sticks. In particular, it sold to a local grocery store, which marked N.Y. Sticks up by 
150%. However, the price in the cottage industry sized market only covered unit costs of the 
products and did not generate a sufficient return for the owners of Classic Meats after marketing, 
administration and general expenses. Indeed, the sales volume at this cottage industry sized 
market was not large enough to lower unit costs. For instance, the sales at the grocery store were 
about 800 to 1200 sticks a month.  
Classic Meats is temporarily inactive. The owners of Classic Meats have not lost hope and see 
there is a large potential for N.Y. Sticks at a commercial scale. The next step for Classic Meats is 
to write a proposal for an “angels’ network”24
 
 to bring some angel investors - wealthy 
individuals who invest in new start-up ventures - into this business.  
 
                                                 
24 An angel group or network is formed by individual angel investors to assess investment opportunities, share their 
expertise and decision-making about investments, and pool their capital (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007).  
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4.3.2  Canadian Prairie Lamb  
Introduction 
Canadian Prairie Lamb (CPL) is a company that was established by the Saskatchewan Sheep 
Development Board (SSDB) and active sheep producers in 2001. The company is governed by 
its shareholders and the board of directors. Saskatchewan sheep producers comprise 
approximately 90% of the shareholders with the remaining 10% located throughout western 
Canada, while the SSDB held a different class of share (Lawrence et al., 2006).  The SSDB has a 
provincial mandate for industry development and supports market development, promotion, 
extension education and producer seminars, funded by sheep producers (SSDB, 2011b). CPL 
was created with the objective of increasing Saskatchewan sheep producers’ returns through 
producing value added lamb products. It is a virtual company that contracts out processing of its 
products to co-packing plants. 
Lamb and pre-prepared food industries 
Canada produces only 40% of its total lamb consumption while the rest is imported, primarily 
from New Zealand and Australia (CLC, 2011). Canadian consumption of lamb is significantly 
lower compared to other meats. For instance, per capita consumption of lamb in Canada 
amounted to 0.45 kg/person in 2008 whereas beef and pork consumption amounted to 12.41 
kg/person and 9.72 kg/person, respectively (CMC, 2008). Canadian lamb production is 
decreasing gradually while consumption of lamb products is growing by 5% a year and tends to 
be larger with new immigrants from countries where lamb has a large cultural presence in the 
diet. Prices of lamb have been high for the past few years and are expected to be maintained in 
the near future (SSDB, 2009). The growing demand for Canadian lamb, largely from select 
immigrant communities, coupled with the decline in supply has contributed to higher prices. 
Consequently, lamb production is likely to decrease further as producers have a tendency to 
market their replacement ewes for profit because of strong prices (SSDB, 2009).  
Saskatchewan is the fourth largest sheep producer in Canada (SSDB, 2009). Statistics Canada’s 
semi-annual survey estimated that on January 1 2011 there were 90,000 head of sheep including 
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49,800 ewes and 37,800 lambs on Saskatchewan farms (Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, 
2011). This was a 2.9 percent increase from the same period of the previous year. With an 
average of 60 ewes, there are 1,000 flocks registered with the SSDB; however, there are also 
some unregistered flocks (SSDB, 2011a). As there is no federal slaughter plant in Saskatchewan, 
most lambs are transported out the province to be slaughtered (SSDB, 2011a). This reduces value 
added activities in the sheep industry in the province and, therefore, CPL wished to produce 
value added lamb products.  
Development of the product 
The SSDB initiated the idea of producing pre-prepared lamb products and started market 
research in 1999. In 2001, CPL applied for funding to finance product development and 
commercialization from the Saskatchewan government and received funding matched by sheep 
producers’ contributions.  
The Food Centre at the University of Saskatchewan developed recipes for its products and 
assisted in satisfying all the federal and provincial requirements including packaging and 
labelling. Raw products such as lamb trim were purchased from a federally inspected lamb 
slaughtering facility in Alberta and shipped to the Food Centre. CPL produced and sold eight 
products, namely Kabobs, Parmesan Lamb Meatballs, Greek Style Lamb Meatballs, Tunisian 
Lamb Cocktail Sausages, Assyrian Lamb Sausage, Mediterranean Lamb Sausage, Roasted Garlic 
& Peppers Lamb Sausage and Moroccan Lamb in Orange Sauce (Lawrence et al., 2006). The 
products are derived from the lamb trim except for the Kabobs. The products are relatively new 
to most Canadian consumers, many of whom have no previous experience with cooking lamb. 
CPL offers an alternative to the traditional lamb market that consists primarily of unprepared 
cuts.  Therefore, CPL felt that its pre-prepared products were suitable for new consumers and 
also consistent with the current consumer preferences for convenience foods. The general 
manager of CPL indicated that their products were well received by the customers in a survey 




Starting in 2001, CPL distributed its products to several small butcher shops and restaurants in 
Saskatchewan. In 2006, CPL negotiated an agreement to stock its products with one of the 
largest retail chains in western Canada. Towards the end of 2006, the business plan that aimed to 
expand distribution through the western Canadian retail chain was conducted for CPL by 
students of the University of Saskatchewan. The plan was expected to start from year 2007 and 
based on production being taken over by the Saskatchewan Toll Processing company. CPL’s 
projected gross profit and net profit margins were calculated at 18.5 percent and 5.6 percent 
respectively, on average, during the first five years of the business plan (Lawrence et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, CPL tried to transfer its production to the Saskatchewan Toll Processing Company, 
but it did not succeed. The general manager of CPL said that the products were not produced 
properly according to the recipes. Therefore, the products were produced at the Food Centre. It 
does not have a capacity to handle commercial scale production. This made unit costs high 
although CPL did receive a premium price from the retailer as lamb was a specialty type of meat. 
Further, the retailer did not ask for any shelving fees.  
The manager mentioned that their small production and small sales volume resulted in a narrow 
gross profit margin insufficient to cover required marketing costs. Since lamb products were 
relatively new for most consumers, there was a need for marketing activities such as 
advertisements, promotions, and demonstrations to introduce the products to consumers and 
maintain interest in the products. Therefore, the company needed to have a high margin to cover 
marketing costs. This could not be achieved without commercial scale production, which made it 
look for a commercial scale co-packing plant from other provinces. The company found the co-
packing plant in Ontario; however, a supply of its raw product, in other words production of 
Canadian lamb, was not large enough. Clearly, cooperating with this co-packer would raise its 
transaction costs, particularly transportation costs.  
There were a couple of other major retailers who expressed an interest in carrying the products in 
their stores, but they wanted to purchase a large volume and were interested in sourcing all of 
their lamb products from one supplier, such as racks and chops in addition to CPL’s pre-prepared 
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lamb products. This would also have necessitated commercial scale production. One advantage 
for CPL was that these retailers would not charge any shelving fees to stock its products because 
of a shortage of Canadian lamb supply in the market compared to the demand. Moreover, CPL 
needed to source racks and chops from its supplier, the lamb slaughtering facility, in Alberta as 
well in order to provide a full range of lamb products to the retailers. This would have made the 
company more dependent on the supplier.  However, the supplier could not supply the large 
volume needed for CPL to meet the retailer’s demand.  
As a result, the consistent supply of lamb has become a major barrier to commercialization of 
CPL’s new products. CPL engages major retailers, feedlots and processors, but does not have 
enough producers who can consistently supply sufficient amounts of lamb. Sheep producers are 
generally small with a flock of 60 ewes on average (SSDB, 2011a). As the manager said, most 
sheep producers raise a few ewes along with cattle or other farming activities. One possible 
solution to coordinating supply could be to enter into contracts with producers for the delivery of 
a certain amount of their lamb production.  
Another major problem was a lack of funding. CPL was financed by its shareholders such as 
sheep producers and the SSDB as well as a Saskatchewan government grant, but funding was not 
sufficient to cover costs. This suggests that even more funds will be needed to achieve large 
scale production and sales volumes. According to the manager, it was estimated to take 2 to 2.5 
years to achieve the desired sales volume and $2 to $2.5 million will be needed for marketing. 
CPL cannot raise this much money just from its shareholders given the limited resources of a 
fairly small producer membership base of the SSDB. Therefore, it is likely that CPL will need to 
bring outside investors into the business or secure a loan.   
Most importantly, CPL initially lacked knowledge of the food industry, particularly how supply 
chains work. It seems that CPL needed a well-functioning value chain to achieve commercial 
success as its supply of the raw product was dependent on sheep producers. Consistently, the 
SSDB has recognized the importance of establishing the value chain that delivered lamb 
products from producers to consumers (SSDB, 2009). The manager also stated that they may 
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need an advisory board that consists of experts from each link of the supply chain such as a 
retailer, a processor, a feedlot operator, a lawyer, an accountant, etc.  
After staying in the supermarket chain for about 1.5 years, in 2008 CPL stopped its activity 
temporarily to assess their situation. The manager indicated that a change in approach would be 
needed to be successful, and that it was likely to take a long time to get the desired sales volume 
for the venture to be a commercial success. The manager pointed out that achieving the required 
sales volume that can generate a sufficient profit was the major challenge rather than accessing 
retail stores. 
The descriptions of the case studies outlined in section 4.3 are used to analyze commercialization 
of Classic Meats and CPL within the theoretical framework in the next section.  
4.4   Case study analysis  
This section discusses the analysis of the case studies within the theoretical framework that was 
developed in Chapter 3. Challenges and barriers to commercialization faced by the two 
companies are elaborated in accordance with the commercialization checklist developed in 
Chapter 3. Also, the transaction cost approach presented in Section 2.4 is applied to identify 
possible transaction costs incurred by the companies.  
4.4.1  Application of the commercialization models     
The economic models of commercialization generally rely on the assumption that capturing 
economies of scale is the main way to attain commercial markets and, thus, full 
commercialization. As well, the commercialization models were based on two possible situations 
that small firms are likely to encounter in their early stages of commercialization. Case 1 
represented small commercializing firms that make a small profit because of the high costs 
associated with a small-plant size and the limited demand of the cottage industry-sized market. 
Case 2 represented small commercializing firms that cannot make a profit due to high unit costs 
given small scale production and high marketing costs relative to production.  
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The commercialization model can be applied to illustrate successful commercialization by 
Classic Meats as CPL’s commercialization does not fit the assumptions of the models. In fact, 
CPL could get initial access to a supermarket chain in its early stage of commercialization even 
though its production scale and sales volume were small. The company did achieve the 
commercial market, but it did not have sufficient funding to finance the required marketing costs 
to establish demand for its new products as well as could not increase its production due to a 
shortage of the raw product. Due to lack of financing, CPL could not undertake sufficient 
marketing to increase the demand for the products. CPL stopped its activity after distributing to 
the supermarket chain for about 1.5 years because it could not make a positive return and 
succeed in attaining a required sales volume. 
Classic Meats commercialization of N.Y. Sticks generally follows case 2 where the firm makes a 
loss from its new product. Due to the products’ attributes, the company targeted convenience 
store chains as its commercial market. As the competition in the market for snacks and 
convenience foods is fierce, Classic Meats could not successfully access the commercial market 
due to a range of hurdles that are postulated in this thesis.  
Classic Meats initially marketed its new products in the cottage industry sized market, 
particularly at a local grocery store. It could not go beyond the early stage of commercialization. 
The company marketed a small volume of the products to a few stores of the international 
convenience store chain in Saskatchewan for a short period; however, it could not get access to 
the whole chain in the province. As expected, accessing supermarket or convenience store chains 
is challenging and it gets even harder if the company does not have personnel who know the 
food industry well.  
A potential economic model of commercialization for Classic Meats is depicted in Figure 4.1. 
The model shows how Classic Meats can move from its early stage of commercialization in the 
cottage industry to the stage of full commercialization where it utilizes its available economies of 




Facing the demand curve of the local grocery store, D0, Classic Meats had a marginal cost curve, 
MC0, and a short-run average total cost curve, SRATC0, in the current cottage industry sized 
market. The company made a loss equal to the area b selling its products at a profit maximizing 
price, P0
Its long-run average cost curve, LRAC, describes how costs vary with the changes in production 
scale in the long run. Due to transaction costs, the convenience store chain’s  willingness to pay 
the supplier, WTPs, does not coincide with its derived demand curve, D
. The unit cost of the product comprised of about 75% of the sale price to the store. 
Hence, given the small quantity of production, the price was insufficient to cover marketing 
costs, which was point-of-sales advertising through posters, as well as administration and general 
expenses that were opportunity costs of the owners’ time and using resources belonging to the 
owners. 
*, and, thus, as in Chapter 
3, transaction costs are  illustrated in the model by the gap between D* and WTPs. Utilizing all 
available economies of scale where Classic Meats faces a marginal cost curve, MC*, and a short-
run average total cost curve, SRATC*, it is able to attain the sales volume Q* that generates a 
supernormal profit equal to the area d.  





















Figure 4.1 Commercialization model of Classic Meats 
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In the case of Classic Meats, they really lacked the experience and knowledge of the food 
industry so that to the route to access the commercial market was to use distributors. If Classic 
Meats sells to a distributor, the model can also be applied with a small modification. If Classic 
Meats sells to the convenience store chain directly, it will receive the convenience store chain’s 
price, Pcs, which is equal to the convenience store chain’s willingness to pay the supplier. Selling 
through the distributor is likely to lower the price the company could receive from the 
convenience store chain because distributors usually pay for marketing. As a result of a decrease 
in marketing costs, the company’s SRATC* 
4.4.2  Challenges and barriers to commercialization 
will move down. However, Classic Meats may face 
higher transaction costs in selling directly to the convenience store than selling to the distributor. 
Overall, the supernormal profit Classic Meats can earn will not change much as the economic 
model of commercialization does not consider the firm’s transaction costs due to complexity.  
On the whole, the model is applicable to show the commercialization challenges faced by Classic 
Meats and its potential pathway to full commercialization. However, if the company uses 
different marketing channels instead of directly selling to the supermarket, the model needs some 
modification. 
Based on the literature review and the economic models of commercialization, Chapter 3 
developed the commercialization checklist that consisted of three main challenges and 
corresponding barriers. Using the checklist, Table 4.1 summarizes what challenges and barriers 
to commercialization were faced by the two agribusinesses, Classic Meats and CPL. The table 
also includes three additional barriers: 1) high marketing costs; 2) lack of control over product 
quality; and 3) limited supply of the raw product. The last two barriers relate to coordination 
between up- and down-stream supply chain partners. 
Classic Meats and CPL must increase their production scale to achieve successful 
commercialization. Increasing production scale requires considerable financial resources to be 
available, but both companies lack financial capital. Both companies did receive matching grants 
from the Saskatchewan government for their product development and launch although they 
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spent a significant amount of money from internal sources.  Therefore, limited internal financial 
resources thwarted further expansion and commercialization.  
Table 4.1 Commercialization Challenges and Barriers by Agribusinesses 
CHALLENGES AND BARRIERS Classic 
Meats 
CPL 
1. INCREASING PRODUCTION SCALE    
1.1. Lack of financial capital   
1.1.1. Lack of internal funding   
1.1.2. Limited access to credit   
1.1.3. Lack of venture capital   
1.2. Lack of human capital    
1.2.1. Lack of qualified personnel    
1.2.2. Lack of knowledge of management, marketing, and 
entrepreneurship  
  
1.3. High costs of commercialization    
2. GETTING INTO COMMERCIAL MARKETS   
2.1. High unit costs    
2.2. High transaction costs    
2.3. Changes in regulations and un-harmonization of private 
standards  
  
2.4. Low opportunity of partnering   
2.5. Lack of knowledge or experience of the industry   
2.6. High marketing costs   
3. DEFINING THE OPTIMAL PRODUCTION SCALE     
3.1. Risks of uncertain demand for innovative products    
3.2. Lack of knowledge of the market   
4. CASE SPECIFIC BARRIERS   
4.1 Limited supply of raw products    
4.2 Lack of control over product quality   
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Financing commercialization is very difficult because of the high risks of failure, and thus high 
costs. Successful commercialization requires large pre-launch and post-launch investments. Like 
many small companies in the early stage of commercialization, Classic Meats and CPL do not 
have production facilities; instead, they contract out their processing to co-packing plants. 
Without tangible assets that could be used as collateral it was difficult for them to obtain debt 
financing. Therefore, they need equity financing thereby bringing investors into their businesses. 
However, finding private investors could be also challenging given the high risks of 
commercialization projects.   
Moreover, using co-packing plants helped the companies to lower start-up costs and made it easy 
to exit from the industry temporarily, but raised an additional barrier – lack of control over 
product quality. Indeed, both companies had problems with the product quality at the co-packing 
plant to which they attempted to transfer their production to scale up. This suggests that there 
was an inability to directly control the production process in this form of transactional 
relationship. As processing was not done by the companies, there was not much need of human 
capital. Nevertheless, for Classic Meats, it seems that they somewhat lacked the knowledge of 
business management and entrepreneurship as they did not realize the potential of some offers of 
cooperation when making key long-run market access decisions.  
Accessing the commercial market was the challenge for Classic Meats, but not for CPL. 
Nonetheless, both companies suffered from not making positive net profit due to high production 
and marketing costs. Due to small scale production and sales volumes, the revenue of both 
companies hardly covered production costs and, therefore, not much money was left for 
marketing. In both cases, marketing costs put a high financial burden on commercialization since 
new food products require continuous post-launch advertising, demonstrations and promotions 
until they reach the required sales volumes. In addition, the companies faced significant 
transaction costs in their exchange relationships with retailers and distributors. Some possible 
transaction costs faced by the companies are discussed in the next section.  
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As suggested by the literature, Canadian food retailers are highly concentrated and, therefore, 
play major roles in their supply chains, having a lot of power over setting prices and selecting 
their suppliers. As a result of strong competition among retailers, large retailers want to keep 
their prices down and, thus, the prices they pay their suppliers. Specifically, the low prices of the 
large retailers caused the distributors to offer even lower prices to Classic Meats, which made its 
products nonviable given the high unit costs of production. The president of Classic Meats stated 
that the national distributor marked the products about 55% over the price paid Classic Meats 
while the retailers that carried N. Y. Sticks marked them up two to three times more. Hence, 
Classic Meats’ opportunity of partnering with the convenience store chains was considerably 
limited due to the high costs relative to the low prices as well as the lack of experience and 
knowledge of the industry.  
On the other hand, CPL did receive the premium price from the retailer, which was attributed to 
the limited supply of Canadian lamb products that gave CPL a little more bargaining power. 
CPL, however, still had a thin gross profit margin that was not sufficient to cover the required 
marketing costs. Despite its small size, CPL’s opportunities for partnering were not particularly 
limited because there were not many domestic competitors with most of the competition coming 
from imports, primarily from New Zealand. 
As both companies contracted out their processing to the Food Centre that was federally 
inspected, they did not worry about the federal and provincial regulations. Indeed, federal and 
provincial inspection and label and packaging requirements were fulfilled by the Food Centre. 
As long as mandatory requirements were satisfied, the retailers did not impose any additional 
private standards. Therefore, regulations and private standards were not an important barrier for 
the companies.  
Both companies did have some knowledge of the market through their business plans as well as 
attending trade shows and testing consumer acceptance of the products.  As a result, their 
products appeared to suit the current consumer demand and received positive feedback from 
consumers in marketing studies. Nevertheless, the lack of experience and knowledge of the food 
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industry was a major barrier to full commercialization by both companies. In particular, Classic 
Meats lost its chance to get accepted by the convenience store chain because they did not 
understand decision-making within the hierarchy of the chain. CPL recognized the advantage of 
developing an advisory board that consisted of experts from every part of the supply chain in 
order to broaden its knowledge of the industry and the market. This indicates that good 
cooperation is crucial to successful commercialization, through enhancement of the knowledge 
of the industry and the market.  
Due to uncertain demand for new products, defining the right volume of production was a 
challenge for the companies in order to minimize costs, mainly transaction costs. Fixed costs per 
unit may drop if an increase in the volume of production is indicated by a reliable forecast of 
expected sales. Transaction costs can be associated with forecasting potential demand and a risk 
of error of forecasting expected sales. For instance, uncertain demand for N.Y. Sticks put Classic 
Meats at risk when projecting the expected sales and production so as to make decisions about 
entering into contracts with distributors or selling its trademark. As a result, a great deal of 
information, time, and effort would be required to draw up more secure contracts. However, even 
secure contracts still involve high risks due to bounded rationality25
4.4.3  Transaction costs 
, thereby raising transaction 
costs. Hence, high transaction costs and the lack of knowledge of the industry affected Classic 
Meats’ decisions to refuse the cooperation offer and, therefore, slowed down the 
commercialization by increasing the time to reach a profitable volume. Facing the challenge of 
defining the optimal production scale, CPL will also face another challenge of ensuring a 
consistent supply of the raw product. 
Transaction cost economics asserts that transaction costs affect a firm’s choice of the appropriate 
marketing channel through which transactions can be carried out the most cost efficiently. 
However, it is hard to identify and quantify transaction costs because transaction cost data cannot 
often be obtained via a regular data collection process. Relying on the available data and the 
                                                 
25 Refer to page 36 for the definition of bounded rationality. 
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literature on transaction cost economics, some transaction costs related to the transactions which 
Classic Meats and CPL likely faced, are identified in Table 4.2. The table categorizes the 
transaction costs of the companies into information costs, negotiation costs, and monitoring 
costs. The companies faced considerable transaction costs that varied by their partners - 
distributors and retailers.  
Information costs 
Both Classic Meats and CPL generally face information costs of identifying the 
retailer/distributor and of forecasting potential demand, and a risk of error of forecasting sales. 
The companies incur costs of identifying their retailers or distributors in order to find out their 
reliability and previous practices of cooperation. Also, they spend time and resources for market 
research to forecast potential demand for the new products. Due to uncertain demand for the new 
products and bounded rationality, there is a risk of error when forecasting sales through the 
retailer or distributor. An additional information cost may arise from having to determine the 
specific requirements of the retailers when the companies sell directly to the retailers.   
Negotiation costs 
Since all of these exchange relationships are secured by contracts, the companies incur the 
negotiation cost of drawing up the contracts that includes the costs of managerial time and effort 
and of hiring lawyers to get legal advice on the contracts. In the current, retailer-driven agri-food 
system, small suppliers like Classic Meats are at a bargaining disadvantage relative to large 
retailers and distributors and, thus, incur the costs by losing possible benefits such as higher 
prices, better shelf placement, and so forth. On the other hand, CPL spends time and resources to 
negotiate for prices, shelf placement of the products, etc. 
  
Table 4.2 Transaction Costs  
№ Transactions Information costs Negotiation costs Monitoring costs 
Classic Meats 
1 Selling to the 
national food 
distributor 
- identifying the distributor 
- forecasting potential demand 
- risk of error of forecasting 
sales 
 
- bargaining disadvantage 
- drawing up the contract 
- travel cost 
- controlling product quality in the co-packing arrangement 
- matching production with actual sales 
-  legally enforcing the broken contract with the co-packing plant 
-  lack of effort by the distributor  
- monitoring the behaviour of the distributor  
- ensuring that marketing is undertaken at the retail stage 
2 Selling to the 
convenience 
store chain in 
NL 
- identifying the retailer 
- forecasting potential demand 
- risk of error of forecasting 
sales 
- finding out the specific 
requirements of the retailer 
- bargaining disadvantage 
- drawing up the contract 
- shelving fees 
- travel cost 
- relative marketing cost 
- relative transportation cost 
- controlling product quality in the co-packing arrangement 
- matching production with actual sales 
-  legally enforcing the broken contract with the co-packing plant 
-  monitoring the behaviour of the retailer  
- lack of retailer effort  
- risk of damage during transportation 
- risk of delivery delay  






- identifying the distributor 
- forecasting potential demand 
- risk of error of forecasting 
sales 
 
- bargaining disadvantage 
- drawing up the contract 
- negotiating royalties  
- matching production with actual sales 
- lack of effort by the distributor  
- monitoring the behaviour of the distributor  
- risk of not receiving royalties  
- risk of losing the product recipes 




- identifying the distributor 
- forecasting potential demand 
- risk of error of forecasting 
sales 
 
- bargaining disadvantage 
- drawing up the contract 
- scheduling frequent delivery 
 
- controlling product quality in the co-packing arrangement 
- matching production with actual sales 
-  legally enforcing the broken contract with the co-packing plant 
-  lack of effort by the distributor  
- monitoring the behaviour of the distributor  
- damage loss during transportation 
- ensuring that marketing is undertaken at the retail stage 
Canadian Prairie Lamb 





- identifying the retailer 
- forecasting potential demand 
- risk of error of forecasting 
sales 
- finding out the specific 
requirements of the retailer 
- drawing up the contract 
- relative marketing cost 
- relative transportation cost  
- negotiating for prices and 
shelf placement of the 
products 
- controlling product quality in the co-packing arrangement 
- matching production with actual sales 
-  legally enforcing the broken contract with the co-packing plant 
-  lack of retailer effort  
- monitoring the behaviour of the distributor  
- risk of damage during transportation 
- risk of delivery delay 
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When selling directly to the convenience store chain in Newfoundland and Labrador, Classic 
Meats would incur shelving fees, travel costs, and additional marketing and transportation costs 
relative to selling to the distributors. This transportation cost includes the opportunity cost of the 
company personnel’s time and effort to organize transportation to the retailer in addition to the 
direct transportation cost. Similarly, the travel cost consists of the direct cost of travel and the 
opportunity cost of the company personnel’s time during the travel. 
In contrast, the distributors organize the delivery from Classic Meats to their client stores as well 
as paying for marketing and store shelving fees. Nevertheless, Classic Meats incurs the 
opportunity cost of the company personnel’s time and effort in scheduling frequent delivery 
when distributing through the Saskatchewan food distributor that does not have a capacity to 
handle larger volume.  Moreover, Classic Meats needs to negotiate royalties when licensing the 
trademark.  
Monitoring costs  
In their exchange relationships, both companies face large monitoring costs related to controlling 
product quality in the co-packing arrangements, matching production with actual sales, legally 
enforcing the broken contract with the co-packing plant, monitoring the behaviour of the 
retailer/distributor, and lack of distributor/retailer effort to properly handle the products and 
undertake sales promotion activities. The costs of matching production with actual sales could 
include the costs of waste resulted from surplus supplies or the costs of storage due to surplus 
production. Legally enforcing broken contracts could include the opportunity cost of the 
company personnel’s time to appear in court and any fees associated with lawyers or arbitration. 
The behaviour of the retailer/distributor needs to be monitored somehow in order to ensure that 
the terms of the contract are fulfilled. In addition, the companies incur the costs arising from the 
risks of damage during transportation and of delivery delay when selling directly to the retailers.  
Further, Classic Meats incurs monitoring costs of ensuring that marketing is undertaken at the 
retail stage when marketing through distributors. Furthermore, it incurs significant monitoring 
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costs associated with selling the trademark, namely the risks of not receiving royalties and of 
losing the product recipes because of possible opportunism. 
In addition to the exchange relationship with the retailer, transactions between CPL and 
Saskatchewan sheep producers involve asset specificity and thus transaction costs. CPL’s supply 
of the main input is totally dependent on sheep producers and thus its investment in 
commercialization and establishing the demand for the lamb products could be asset specific. On 
the other hand, the sheep producers may have site specificity given that there are no other major 
lamb buyers such as abattoir operators and processors in the province because they could incur 
relatively higher transaction costs to sell to other provinces. As a result, the asset specificity and 
possible opportunism necessitate a higher degree of vertical coordination in this exchange 
relationship. Consistent with the predictions of transaction cost theory, producers have shares in 
CPL and, hence, the asset specificity and the opportunism are unlikely to increase the transaction 
costs of both CPL and the sheep producers.  
4.5   Conclusions 
The case study analysis of the two agribusinesses, Classic Meats and Canadian Prairie Lamb, 
were reported in this chapter. Like many small companies in their early stages of 
commercialization, both agribusinesses were virtual companies that did not have production 
facilities. As hypothesized, the companies could not make positive profits in the initial stages of 
commercialization because of the high costs associated with small scale production. The 
economic model of commercialization developed in Chapter 3 was applied to Classic Meats and 
illustrated its commercialization challenges and the potential pathway to commercial success. On 
the contrary, CPL’s commercialization does not fit the assumption of the models. Indeed, CPL 
achieved the commercial market in its early stage of commercialization through access to the 
supermarket chain, but it could not attain the required sales volume due to the insufficient 
marketing as well as the limited production.  
The cases indicate that three main challenges of commercialization, namely increasing 
production scale, accessing the commercial market, and defining optimal production scale, that 
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are suggested by the theoretical framework were pertinent to small commercializing 
agribusinesses. While Classic Meats faced all of them, CPL faced only two because it already 
had access to the commercial market. Indeed, CPL had the advantage because of the shortage of 
Canadian lamb in the market. However, both companies experienced many similar barriers to 
commercialization, namely lack of financial capital, high costs of commercialization, high costs 
of production, transaction, and marketing, lack of knowledge of the industry, and risk of 
uncertain demand for innovative products. In addition to these barriers, Classic Meats had few 
opportunities for partnering whereas CPL had to deal with limited supply of raw products. In 
short, the case studies showed that most of the identified challenges and barriers contributed to 
the commercialization failures of the two companies and, therefore, give some validity to the 
commercialization checklist developed in Chapter 3. With the checklist, small agribusinesses can 
anticipate commercialization challenges more realistically and, therefore, be prepared to 
overcome these challenges and barriers to commercialization.  
Most of these challenges and barriers were explained based on the literature on supply chain 
theory and transaction cost economics. In particular, as suggested by supply chain theory, the 
high degree of consolidation and, thus, large market power in the retail sector, meant that both 
companies had very little bargaining power and there were limited partnering opportunities for 
Classic Meats. Of the barriers to commercialization, the lack of knowledge of the industry was a 
major deterrent to commercialization by the companies, suggesting the need for enhancing 
cooperation or networking to facilitate information sharing about the industry, investors, retailers 
and/or distributors. Furthermore, transaction costs associated with the exchange relationships of 
the companies were identified and discussed through the lens of a transaction cost approach.  
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CHAPTER 5:   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter summarizes the research objectives of the thesis and the major findings of the 
research. Also, it discusses the limitations of the research and the potential areas for further 
research.  
Analyzing commercialization of innovation in small Saskatchewan agribusinesses was the main 
objective of this thesis. The thesis specifically wished to 1) document the factors affecting 
commercialization successes or failures, particularly the barriers to commercialization faced by 
small scale or start-up Saskatchewan agribusinesses, 2) develop a theoretical framework to 
illustrate how small firms achieve successful commercialization, which can apply to small 
commercializing firms anywhere in the world, and 3) develop strategies that endeavour to 
overcome challenges associated with commercialization and that result in successful 
commercialization.  
The case studies of the two Saskatchewan agribusinesses were undertaken in the thesis to 
achieve these goals. The data for the case studies were collected through semi-structured 
interviews and examination of written documents.  The president and the manager of the two 
food processing companies were interviewed and their commercialization performance and the 
factors influencing the failures of their commercialization were documented in Chapter 4. The 
economic models of commercialization were developed in Chapter 3 and applied to the case 
studies. The models suggest that achieving economies of scale is the main strategy to 
consistently access commercial markets and, therefore, a key component of commercialization 
success. Also, the case study analysis presented in Chapter 4 indicated that upon understanding 
the challenges and barriers to commercialization, small agribusinesses can make more realistic 
decisions and determine ways to overcome the challenges and barriers.  
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5.1   Summary of research findings 
Generally, the case study evidence presented in Chapter 4 has established how these two small 
agribusinesses struggled to commercialize their new products and what challenges and barriers 
were faced by them. Further, the case study analysis has lent some validation to the economic 
models of commercialization developed in this thesis.  
 It was hypothesized in Chapter 3 that in their early stages of commercialization small firms are 
likely to encounter the situations whereby they make either only a small profit or a loss due to 
the high costs associated with their small scale and the limited demand arising from a cottage 
industry-sized market. The economic models of commercialization relied on this hypothesis and 
the assumption that commercial markets can be achieved by taking advantage of economies of 
scale. CPL’s commercialization was a little different from the assumptions of the models because 
it achieved the commercial market in its early stage of commercialization through access to the 
supermarket chain. However, CPL could not attain the required sales volume due to the large 
marketing costs required to generate demand for its new products as well as constraints on 
production. Therefore, the model was applied to the case of Classic Meats. The model was 
applicable if all the assumptions of the model held and showed its potential path to successful 
commercialization as well as indicating the associated challenges and barriers.  
Furthermore, the challenges and barriers to commercialization for the two companies were 
identified and compared to those identified in the checklist for commercialization. Three main 
challenges of commercialization, namely increasing production scale, accessing commercial 
markets, and defining optimal production scale and their corresponding barriers were developed 
in Chapter 3. The cases have supported the importance of the challenges and barriers identified 
and, thus, the checklist can be used by small start-up agribusinesses to gauge their readiness for 
commercialization. Specifically, except that CPL did not find it challenging to gain initial access 
to the commercial market, the companies experienced all of these challenges. Also, they 
experienced barriers such as a lack of financial capital, high costs of commercialization, high 
unit costs, high transaction and marketing costs, lack of knowledge of the industry, and uncertain 
demand for innovative products. Each company also faced barriers specific to their cases. In 
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particular, Classic Meats had very limited opportunities for partnering, whereas CPL had to deal 
with a limited supply of the raw product.  
Ultimately, increasing their production scale was crucial for the companies in achieving 
successful commercialization whereby they could generate positive returns from the new 
products. Without having production facilities, the companies found the Food Centre an 
excellent facility to use for the product development, but it is only suitable for small scale pilot 
production. Both companies had experienced problems with co-packing arrangements with the 
Toll Processing Company in Saskatchewan and had difficulties in finding another co-packing 
plant in relative proximity that could produce at a commercial scale. For CPL, the limited supply 
of the raw product acted as an additional deterrent to achieving commercial scale production.  
For both companies, their small scale production and, therefore, small sales volumes resulted in 
thin gross profit margins. As a result, the companies suffered from not making positive net profit 
due to high unit costs of production and, thus, were not able to fully finance necessary marketing 
activities. Indeed, effective marketing was essential since their products were relatively new to 
the market.  
As expected, the companies started marketing their new products in the cottage industry-sized 
market, but CPL was able to enter into the supermarket sector relatively quickly. Nonetheless, 
both companies could not achieve full commercialization, going beyond the early stages of 
commercialization due to a number of challenges and barriers.  For example, Classic Meats 
found it more challenging to get access to its targeted commercial market, particularly 
convenience store chains as it competed in both the snack and convenience food industries where 
the competition is fierce. As a result, it used a distributor, thereby receiving an even lower price 
from the distributor than that it would have received directly from the retailer. Its gross profit 
was insufficient to cover marketing, administration and general expenses because of high unit 
costs resulting from small scale production. On the other hand, CPL could get a premium price 
from the retailer, but high unit costs associated with its small scale production resulted in the 
narrow gross profit margin that was also insufficient to cover the required marketing costs.  
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Based upon the literature and the available data, some transaction costs associated with the 
exchange relationships of the two companies were identified in Chapter 4. With small scale 
production Classic Meats had limited opportunities for partnering and, thus, would incur more 
significant transaction costs than those of CPL to market its products via retailers and 
distributors. In contrast, regardless of its small scale production, CPL had more opportunities to 
partner as there were not many domestic competitors that produce similar products. The retailers 
did not impose any private standards beyond the federal and provincial regulations and, hence, 
regulations and private standards were not a significant barrier to commercialization. The lack of 
experience and knowledge of the food industry was a considerable barrier to full 
commercialization. 
The uncertain demand for the new products created a challenge in defining the optimal 
production scale for the companies. High risks associated with projecting the demand as well as 
possible projection errors raised their transaction costs, thereby preventing the companies from 
reaching profitable volumes and full commercialization.  
In brief, all of these challenges and barriers had an impact on the commercialization failures of 
the two companies. A lesson to be learned from the cases is for firms to research the industry 
where a new product is going to be introduced and the hierarchy of the retail chain in order to 
determine the most appropriate entry strategy. Increased cooperation or networking may help 
firms to overcome these challenges and barriers.  
Supply chain theory and transaction cost economics shed some light on the challenges and 
barriers to commercialization and provided a basis for the economic models of 
commercialization. Applying a transaction cost approach, transaction costs associated with the 
exchange relationships of the companies were identified and discussed in Section 4.4.3. It seems 
that the companies did not overtly realize the transaction costs identified in this thesis at the time, 
but these costs implicitly affected their decisions at each step towards commercialization. Hence, 
transaction costs need to be considered more systematically when making decisions. 
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Concentration and, thus, considerable market power in the Canadian retail sector, translated into 
very limited bargaining power for these small companies and raised their transaction costs.  
5.2   Limitations of the research 
Limitations of the research undertaken in this thesis should be acknowledged. First, the study 
specifically focused on commercialization of new food products by small scale agribusinesses. 
Therefore, the economic models of commercialization and the checklist for commercialization 
developed in the thesis are unlikely to suit large scale firms as well as the firms in which the 
assumptions of the models do not hold.  
The economic models of commercialization suggest capturing economies of scale is a key 
strategy to achieve commercial markets and, thus, successful commercialization. However, 
depending on a product’s attributes, there could be other possible strategies that also lead to 
successful commercialization such as achieving a niche market through e-commerce marketing. 
Hence, the work undertaken in this thesis did not take into account such possible strategies for 
successful commercialization.  
Moreover, the transaction costs of the two companies identified in Section 4.4.3 are specific to 
these cases, and thus, cannot be applied to every exchange relationship between a small firm and 
a distributor/retailer. It is also possible that some transaction costs have not been identified. 
Furthermore, quantification of these transaction costs is not possible due to data limitations.   
Finally, because of the difficulty of finding research participants who are willing to share their 
experiences of commercialization and the time limitation, the case studies of only two companies 
were undertaken in this thesis. Also, these companies were not successful in the 
commercialization of their products.  Therefore, the applicability of the economic models of 
commercialization and of the commercialization checklist would be strengthened if more 
companies, especially cases of successful commercialization, were studied.  
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5.3   Suggestions for further research 
There are some further research opportunities that may advance the work undertaken in this 
thesis. First, the two case studies shed light on commercialization and its challenges and 
validated the applicability of the economic models of commercialization and of the checklist for 
commercialization. However, more case studies would provide further empirical evidence to 
corroborate the case study results and the applicability of the theoretical framework. Also, cases 
of successful commercialization by small scale agribusinesses may reveal additional factors that 
influence the success of commercialization.  
Moreover, the case study analysis underlying the thesis specifically dealt with the 
commercialization of new food products by small agribusinesses in Saskatchewan. Following the 
results from this thesis, further research could extend to other products and in other regions in 
order to fully test the applicability of the economic models of commercialization and of the 
commercialization checklist.  
The thesis suggests that exercising economies of scale is the main strategy to achieve successful 
commercialization. Therefore, another avenue for further research would be to study potential 
ways to overcome the challenges and barriers to commercialization documented in the thesis, 
thereby developing other strategies designed for small innovative agribusinesses. This would 
help small agribusinesses to succeed and policy makers to develop appropriate policies that 
support small agribusinesses.  
Lastly, applying the concepts of transaction cost economics, some transaction costs of the two 
agribusinesses associated with commercializing their new products have been identified in the 
thesis, but how these costs impacted on decisions pertaining to commercialization was not 
examined. Therefore, one may wish to study the impacts of transaction costs on exchange 
relationships during commercialization. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW
You are invited to participate in a study entitled: “An economic analysis of innovation and 
commercialization in small Saskatchewan agribusinesses”. Please read this form carefully, and 
feel free to ask questions you might have. 
Researcher:  Undrakh Ganbaatar, MSc Candidate 
  Department of Bioresource Policy, Business and Economics 
  University of Saskatchewan 
                     Tel: (306) 966-2041 
     
Purpose and procedure: The purpose of this research is to document factors that affect 
successes and failures in commercialization by small agribusinesses and barriers to 
commercialization of product innovation and to develop strategies for successful 
commercialization. This research is coordinated by the Department of Bioresource Policy, 
Business and Economics (Prof. William Brown), University of Saskatchewan. The results of this 
study will form a key part of Ms. Undrakh Ganbaatar’s Master of Science thesis in Bioresource 
Policy, Business and Economics. The research is funded by Saskatchewan Ministry of 
Agriculture, Alliance for Food and Bio-products Innovation.  
You have been selected because you are involved in the commercialization activities of your 
company and have sound knowledge and rich experience of the company. You will be asked to 
participate in an interview. Each interview is expected to last between 30-60 minutes. If you give 
permission, the interview will be audio recorded. You should feel free to decline to answer any 
particular question(s) and to shut off the voice recorder at any time during the interview.  
Potential benefits: Your participation will help to develop strategies that endeavour to overcome 
the challenges associated with commercialization and result in successful commercialization. 
Thus, findings from this research may help small agribusinesses to improve their performance 
and policy makers to develop policies regarding commercialization and support of small 
agribusinesses, thereby reducing barriers to commercialization and fostering economic growth. It 
is possible that you and your company may receive no direct benefits from participating in this 
research.  
Potential risks: As all data will be stored in a safe and secure manner and all information will be 
confidential, the research is expected to pose minimal risk. In unlikely cases where controversial 
remarks that could have negative consequences for your relationships with others are made, the 
researcher will try to protect your identity in the ways described below. If for some reason the 
Researcher wishes to quote your comments in some way that might reveal your identity, she will 
seek your permission beforehand.    
Storage of Data: Data of interview and original audio recording, if applicable, will be securely 
stored by the Supervisor (Prof. William Brown) at the Department of Bioresource Policy, 
Business and Economics for a period of at least five years. The data will be destroyed beyond 
recovery after 5 years when it is no longer required. 
 CONSENT FORM 
Confidentiality: Once interview responses have been analyzed and prior to the publication of 
research findings, you will be given the opportunity to add, alter, or delete information you 
provided from a final report as he/she sees fit. Only the Researcher and Supervisor will have 
access to the interview data and original audio recording.  
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The research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats, both print and electronic. 
These materials may be further used for purposes of conference presentations or publication in 
academic journals, books or popular press. In these publications, the data will be reported in a 
manner that protects confidentiality and the anonymity of participants. Participants will be 
identified without names being used, giving minimal information (for instance, what 
organization you are affiliated with and whether you are a manager) if this information is 
relevant. Pseudonyms or composite profiles may be used to disguise identity further, if 
necessary. In principle, actual names will not be used; however, participants whose position 
involves speaking on behalf of the organization may be asked if certain comments they have 
made can be attributed to them by name in publications. Any communication of these results that 
has clear potential to compromise your public anonymity will not proceed without your approval. 
Right to Withdraw: Your participation is voluntary, and you can answer only those questions 
that you are comfortable with. There is no guarantee that you will personally benefit from your 
involvement. The information that is shared will be held in strict confidence and discussed only 
with the research team. You may withdraw from the research for any reason, at any time, without 
penalty of any sort. If you choose to withdraw from the study at any time, any data that you have 
contributed will be destroyed at your request. You will be informed of any major changes that 
occur in the circumstances or purpose and design of the research that may have a bearing on your 
decision to remain as a participant. If, after the interview, you think of something that you would 
like to change or delete, or you would like to withdraw your responses from the research, you 
may contact the Researcher at the number provided to request the change or withdrawal.  
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the research, please feel free to contact the 
Researcher at the number provided. This research was approved on ethical grounds by the 
University of Saskatchewan’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board on November 9, 2010.  Any 
questions regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee through the 
Ethics Office. This office can be contacted by e-mail at ethics.office@usask.ca or by phone at 
(306) 966-2084. 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided; I have had an 
opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered. I consent to participate in 
the study, understanding that I may withdraw my consent at any time. A copy of this Consent 
Form has been given to me for my records.   
 
__________________________   _________________________ 
(Name of Participant)         (Date) 
 
__________________________   _________________________ 





1. What is the history of your company?  
2. What is the ownership structure of your company? 
3. What are the main activities of your company?  
4. Does your company have a plant to produce your new product?  
5. How many full-time employees does your company have? 
6. Did your company use any program(s) sponsored by the federal government or provincial 
governments for the innovation and commercialization?  
a. What percentage of the total development cost was it equal?  
Product development: 
7. What is the new product that you brought onto the market during the last decade?  
8. Did your company conduct any R&D activities for your product innovation?  
a. If No, how did your company originate the idea of your new product?  
9. How long did it take for your company to develop your new product?  
10. How did you fund the development cost? 
Commercialization: 
11. When did your company introduce your product to the market?   
12. How much was the total cost of product launch?  
13. Was your company able to obtain funding from outside sources?  
a. If your company was limited or refused any requests for funds from any source when 
raising capital for commercialization, what were the reasons? 
14. Did you have a business plan for your project of introducing new products?  
15. What distribution channels did your company use for marketing your new product?  
16. What commercialization activities (market research, launching advertising, a market plan, 
product positioning or profiling, a project feasibility study, test sales and demonstrations, 
etc.) did you carry out for your new product?  
17. How much is the unit cost of your new product relative to the similar products in the 
market?  
18. How much is or was your total production of your new product?  
19. What percentage is it relative to your plant’s capacity?  
20. Did or does your production generate sufficient returns from your investment?  
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a. If No, what were the reasons? 
21. Has your company tried to sell your product via supermarket or grocery store chains?  
22. Was or would be the volume you can supply acceptable to be carried in supermarkets? 
23. Did or would you need to pay slotting allowances (shelving fees) to be carried your 
product in supermarket(s)?  
a. If yes, how much was it?  
24. How much was the unit cost of your new product relative to the price supermarket(s) 
pay?  
25. What standards and requirements of food safety and quality did or would the 
supermarket(s) ask for?  
26. Were there any other requirements from the supermarket(s)? 
27. What other challenges did or would you face to enter supermarket or grocery store 
chains? 
28. How did or would your company’s volume of sales increase when started supplying 
supermarket chains?  
29. Did your company need a larger plant (co-packer) to supply supermarket(s)? 
a. Did your company have an adequate number of qualified personnel required for this 
commercial scale production? 
30. How did or would you forecast the demand for your new product in the commercial 
market?  
31.  Did your company’s personnel have enough information about the market and consumer 
needs when making decisions on marketing? 
32. What benefits did or would you gain from entering supermarket supply chains? 
33. How did regulations and/or standards affect your commercialization performance? 
34. What other barriers did you encounter for your commercialization of new food products?  
35. What factors do you think affected your success or failure in commercialization?  
36. How do you think your company can increase returns from the investment in the new 
product, if your company was not successful financially? 
